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AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN WATER
ALLOCATION SYSTEMS COMPARED
PETER N. DAVIS*
Amid general plenty, local and regional shortages of water have
appeared in the eastern United States! These shortages are largely the
result of intense concentrations of water demand on the more import-
ant rivers—rivers which, for the most part, are heavily polluted. 2 This
problem is heightened by the fact that the location of major popula-
tion and industrial centers has only partially depended on availability
of water supplies. In many areas, local surface and ground water
supplies are inadequate and water must be imported to make up the
deficit.° Moreover, demands on water supplies for supplementary
irrigation, for hydro-electric power, and for recreational and conserva-
tion purposes are expected to become increasingly more acute." These
shortages raise the question whether the existing riparian law' in the
East is adequate to the task of water allocation which lies ahead, or
whether some other water right system should be substituted for
riparianism.°
* B.A., Haverford College, 1959; LLB, University of Wisconsin, 1963; Member,
U.S. Supreme Court, Wisconsin, District of Columbia, and U.S. Patent Office Bars;
General Attorney, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Lecturer, University of Wisconsin
Law School; Formerly associated with Ely & Duncan, Washington D.C.
This article will form part of a thesis to be submitted to the University of Wiscon-
sin for an S.J.D. degree. Work on the Australian law was supervised by the late Pro-
fessor Jacob H. Beuscher, University of Wisconsin Law School, and by Professor G.
Sawer, Department of Law, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National Univer-
sity. Research at Australian National University in 1963-64 was financed by a Fullbright
Scholarship from the U.S. Educational Foundation. Additional research at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in 1964-65 was financed by grants from the U.S. Public Health Service
and from the Law School.
Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
1 The eastern United States, for purposes of this article, consists of the 31 states
extending eastwardly from and including the tier of states along the west bank of the
Mississippi River. These are generally regarded as riparian doctrine states. The remaining
17 western states on the mainland are generally regarded as prior appropriation doctrine
states. A few western states are dual doctrine states, following both riparianism and
prior appropriation.
2 See Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 553 (1968)..
3 See Aulenbach, Water—Our Second Most Important Natural Resource, 9 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 535, 549-50 (1968).
4 See generally H. Landsberg, L. Fischman & J. Fisher, Resources in America's
Future (1963).
5 Riparianism gives the owner of land abutting a stream a right to a reasonable
use of the stream's water. This right is correlative with the rights of other riparian
owners. Sec pp. 676-88 , infra.
o Cf. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, S Natural Resources J. 1, 48 (1965); Trelease, A Model State Water Code for
River Basin Development, 22 Law & Contemn. Prob. 301 (1957). Riparianism has been
discussed critically. Ellis, Some Current and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the
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This article will examine in its latter section four water use doc-
trines: (1) riparianism, (2) prior appropriation, (3) temporal non-
priority permit systems and (4) marketplace concepts. The major
strengths and weaknesses of each will be compared in the light of
five criteria: (1) security of water right fOr investment purposes,
(2) efficiency of water use, (3) flexibility in the allocative process to
allow for economic growth, changing technology and changing
demands, (4) protection of the public interest and the preservation
of watercourse amenities, and (5) the allowance of scope for private
initiative.
In the first section of this article, the Australian system for licens-
ing private diversions will be examined in detail as an example of a
temporal nonpriority permit system that has been in effect for a length
of time unparalleled in this country.? The Australian concepts as
enacted in the three states within the River Murray basin (Victoria,
New South Wales and South Australia) are presented both for com-
parisons with American systems and as a fund of experience for use by
commentators in the future.'
I. THE AUSTRALIAN WATER ALLOCATION EXPERIENCE
The water law of Australia has generated two main allocative
systems: extensive, government-run irrigation areas, and licenses or
permits for private diversions. A brief summary of the historical
development of irrigation areas in the River Murray basin states will
be presented first. Then the legal questions raised by abolishing com-
mon law riparian rights and substituting a system of individual licenses
will be discussed. Finally, the licensing statutes of the Australian
states will be examined in detail.
Eastern States, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 237, 254-58 (1956) ; C. Fisher, Western Experience
and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in The Law of Water Allocation 75 (D. Haber &
S. Bergen ed. 1958). C. Haar & B. Gordon, Legislative Change of Water Law in Massa-
chusetts, in The Law of Water Allocation 1 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958), also pub-
lished as Riparian Water Rights v. A Prior Appropriation System: A Comparison, 38
B.U.L. Rev. 207 (1958).
Reliance on market forces for the allocation of water rights is promoted by several
economists. See, e.g., M. Gaffney, Comparison of Market Pricing, and Other Means of
Allocating Water Resources, in Water Law and Policy in the Southeast 195, 215 (Instit.
of Law & Gov't, School of Law, Univ. of Ga., 1962) ; J. Hirshleiter, J. De Haven &
J. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy, chs. III, IV, IX, XII
(1960) ; Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J. Law
& Econ. 41 (1959).
7 In a temporal nonpriority system, a government agency issues water use rights,
contracts, licenses, permits, etc., and revokes them, without regard to time of issuance.
The oldest such system in America was adopted in Minnesota in 1937. Minn. Stat. Ann.
$§ 105.41-A7 (1964).
8 There is no extensive discussion in Australian or American literature of Australian
allocative systems. But see Beise, Consider Victoria, 21 Dicta 95 (1944).
Note that the Murray River system, in the southeastern part of the continent, is
the only sizable system that has received extensive economic development.
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A. Historical Development of Irrigation in Australia
The problems of regulating irrigation in an environment of
scarcity are not unique to the United States. Australia faced this
problem very early.' The country is largely arid" with erratic stream-
flows. Water has been exploited principally for irrigation; at first
as a supplement to dryland agriculture, but later as a distinct form
of agriculture. Surface water supplies have been stored in huge reser-
voirs and conveyed through hundreds of miles of main distribution
canals. Irrigation areas have been developed as a means of populating
the land and as a basis of extensive land reform schemes. Most of
this development has taken place in the basin of the River Murray
system.
1. Physical Environment of the River Murray Basin.—The basin
of the River Murray, as delimited by contour lines, has a catchment
of 414,000 square miles, or about one-seventh of the whole of the
Australian continent!' The Murray system has an average annual
flow of about 10 million acre-feet, derived from only 39' percent
of its catchment.' The river flows northwest from the Snowy
Mountains area across the very flat riverine plains, characterized by
an array of anastomosing channels, anabranches and billabongs, to
the malice sand plains!' There, near Mildura, Victoria, it is joined
by two of its major tributaries: the Murrumbidgee, paralleling it from
the east, and the Darling from the northeast. It then flows west into
9 Australia is a federal parliamentary nation containing six states and two federal
territories: New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and
Western Australia, and the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.
The six states were self-governing British colonies prior to federation in 1901. The Parlia-
ments of each state have all legislative powers not specifically granted to the Federal
Parliament by the Australian Constitution. Among the state powers are control and dis-
position of Crown lands (the public domain) and waters of the state. The federal gov-
ernment is specifically granted power over navigation, but it may not "abridge the right
of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for
conservation or irrigation." Commonwealth of Australia Constitution §1 98, 100. This
means that the federal government may not enact laws affecting irrigation systems. 1 C.
King, An Outline of Closer Settlement in New South Wales 224 (1957). See G. Sawer,
Australian Government Today (7th ed. 1961).
19 Article "Australia" in 2 Encyclopedia Americana 564, 565 (1958 ed).
11 River Murray Comm'n, Development of Control of the Waters of the River
Murray under the River Murray Agreement, in Proceedis of the Regional Technical
Conference on Water Resources Development in Asia and the Far East 422, U.N. Doc.
ST/ECAFE/ SER.F/9 (1956); Lang, Australian Water Resources, with Particular
Reference to Water Supplies in Central Australia, 18 J. Instil. Eng'rs Austl. 51, 55 (1946).
12 Lang, supra note 11, at 56. The Columbia River has a catchment slightly
smaller than the River Murray's, but its flow is over 16 times larger. Tisdall, Australian
Water Policy, 12 Aqua (Vict.) 227, 228 (1961). (Aqua is the house journal of the State
River & Water Supply Comm'n, Vict.).
13 That is, the river system is characterized by an array of interjoining channels,
diverging branches, and blind channels leading out from rivers. The malice sand plains
consist of dense thickets formed by the mallee, a kind of low-growing eucalyptus.
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South Australia through a 6-mile-wide valley to Overland Corner
where it turns south through a limestone gorge to Lakes Alexandrina
and Albert and the sea at Goolwa, about 1600 miles from its source.
Irrigation has been fostered on the riverine plains of Victoria and
New South Wales and in the wide valley in South Australia. Major
headworks have been constructed on the River Murray and all of its
significant tributaries. Additional water is being added to the Murray
and Murrumbidgee through the transmountain diversion tunnels of
the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority."
Agriculture in the interior of Australia has long suffered from a
skimpy and erratic rainfall and a high evaporation rate, particularly
during the growing season. Rainfall in the Murray-Murrumbidgee
basin in southeastern Australia, where the major irrigation schemes
are located, averages 17 inches annually. It has a striking variation,
ranging from 60 inches in the highlands of Victoria above Albury to
less than 12 inches in the Murray district of South Australia?' In the
western reaches of the basin the chance of receiving the one and one-
half inches of rainfall each month necessary for maintaining wheat
growth during the growing season is 25 percent?' Because of a very
high evaporation rate during the summer, sufficient rainfall to promote
the growth of natural pasture in the same region occurs on an average
of one year in seven." Complicating the problem of securing water
are long cycles of drought and plentiful rainfall. Droughts have lasted
for as long as seven years. While they last, major rivers commonly
dry up."
2. Early Response to Climatic Variations.—The area drained by
the River Murray was settled as a result of the explorations of John
Oxley, Hamilton Hume and Charles Sturt between 1817 and 1830. It
was a harsh, arid area populated only by scattered aboriginal tribes.
During the 40 years after 1830 the area filled with huge grazing "sta-
tions" raising sheep for the wool market. After 1870 some of the area
was converted to large dryland wheat farms."
Because of the violent fluctuations in rainfall, graziers and wheat
farmers in the Murray basin early turned to rivers for their water
14 When fully developed, over 1,920,000 acre-feet of water will be diverted annually
to the Murray basin. Snowy Mountains Authority, The Snowy Mountains Scheme:
History of the Scheme, Irrigation Aspects, Electricity Generation 10, June 1963 (pam-
phlet).
15 Lang, supra note 11, at 55; see generally W.H.R. Nimm, World's Water
Supply and Australia's Portion of It, 21 J. Instit. Eng'rs Austl. 29 (1949).
16 Lang, supra note 11, at 59.
17 Id. at 62.
15 The River Murray itself dried up three times; in 1830, 1912 and 1922. Article
"Australia" in 2 Encyclopedia Britannica 702, 704 (1958 ed.).
10 For a history of early settlement of the interior, see M. Clark, A Short History
of Australia 55-96 (1963); 1 C. King, supra note 9.
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supply for domestic and stock water purposes. In spite of government
programs to drill artesian wells, and to provide public watering places
along stock routes, 2° pressure developed for canal-fed domestic and
stock water supply systems and for supplementary irrigation systems.
Legislative relief in Victorian in the early 1800's proved inadequate.
3. Irrigation Act 1886 (Victoria).—A Royal Commission on Water
Supply was appointed in Victoria in 1884 to search for more effective
relief, and to investigate the possibilities for full-blown irrigation
schemes. Alfred Deakin, later Prime Minister of Australia and a
strong advocate of irrigation, was appointed chairman. Many of the
basic elements of Australian water allocation law stem from his assess-
ment of irrigation systems and law in the western United States, particu-
larly California and Colorado, and in India, Egypt and Italy. 22
Deakin viewed the confused state of water rights in California prior
to Lux v. Ilaggin" with horror, and decided that the system of riparian
rights then in force in Victoria should be abolished. The resulting
Irrigation Act 1886 24 was a comprehensive codification of old and new
provisions whose total effect was revolutionary in impact. It contained
six major ideas:
First, riparian rights were abolished and the waters of the state
were "nationalized." "The right to the use and flow and to the control
of the water at any time in any ... water-course shall . . . vest in the
Crown."2 ' By force of this provision, riparian owners could not, by
insisting on a right to a "natural flow," prevent upstream riparians
from irrigating. 2° "Nationalization" of the waters of the state gave
the Crown power to allocate water freely, tended to diminish litigation
in irrigation areas and avoided monopolization of water rights by land
speculators after canals were constructed 2 7
26 In New South Wales, many public artesian wells were drilled under the program
authorized by Public Watering-Places Act 1884, 48 Vict. No. 16 (N.S.W.).
67 E.g., Water Conservation Act 1881, Act No. 716 (Viet.), and Water Conservation
Act 1883, Act No. 778 (Vict.).
22 See A. Deakin, First Progress Report of Royal Comm'n on Water Supply,
Irrigation in Western America, 2 Vict. Pad. Papers 731 (1885).
23 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
21 Act No. 898 (Via.).
25 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 4 (Viet.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 4(1) (Viet.).
26 Speech by A. Deakin, Minister of Water Supply, in support of Water Supply
and Irrigation Bill, Legislative Assembly, June 24, 1886, 51 Vict. Parl. Deb. 415, 440-41
(1886).
27 Id. at 441. The Act has virtually eliminated water rights litigation in Victoria.
Deakin cited in this context the Colorado Constitution of 1876, art. XVI, § 5, which
declared all streams within the state to be "the property of the public, ... dedicated to
the use of the people ......From a quick view of his language, it would seem he thought
the Colorado Constitution created a state proprietorship in water. But close examination
shows he recognized it is probably only declaratory of the common law publici juris
concept as a prelude to the prior appropriation doctrine. See Colo. Const. art. XVI, §§ 5,
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Second, all riparians were given a statutory license to divert
water for domestic and stock watering purposes?' Owners of land
alienated by the Crown and conveyed to private ownership prior to
the date of the Act were also permitted to divert water for irrigating
small gardens." This right, which the Australians call the statutory
riparian right, is similar to the "natural" use allowed to riparians,
without formal governmental authorization, by the common law.
Third, all other diversions were prohibited except as authorized by
the Act." This provision had the effect of requiring licenses for all
diversions classed as "extraordinary" or "artificial" at common law.
These uses include dams for mill ponds, and diversions for manufact-
uring and irrigation?'
This provision raised the question whether the Act destroyed
water rights which had vested in the riparian proprietors. Deakin
addressed himself to this question during the debates on the bill.
[T]he riparian law of England places riparian rights even
above those of the Crown. The Crown has only the same
rights as private landowners in so far as it possesses land
along the banks of any stream. The question, of course, is—
Does this law obtain in Victoria?, It is understood that [one
authority] was of opinion that there was no such thing as
riparian law in Victoria.... pint there is no clear and
6 (1876); A. Deakin, supra note 22, at 742. See also Lasky, From Prior Appropriation
to Economic Distribution of Water by the State—Via Irrigation Administration, 1 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 161, 174-87 (1929); Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of
Water, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 638, 642-43 (1957).
28 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 4 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 14 (Viet.). Domestic use was defined in the Act as:
Wise for household purposes or for watering animals kept for domestic purposes,
but does not include use for watering any other animals or any trees shrubs
plants grass lawns or courts or flower garden kitchen garden or other garden
whatsoever or any part of the curtilage of a house or for the provision of power
or for fountains ponds or ornamental purposes or for any trade or business
or for any other purpose whatsoever.
Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 3 (Vict.). [Ed. note: lack of commas in original.}
29 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 4 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 14 (Viet.).
Domestic uses at common law usually are not described in the cases as including
irrigation of small gardens. But one English case does suggest that watering a small
garden with buckets would be reasonable under any circumstances. Embrey v. Owen,
155 Eng. Rep. 579, 587 (Ex. 1851). This is, of course, the definition of an "ordinary"
use.
39 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 4 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 6 (Vict.).
31 Irrigation of any kind has not been regarded as an "ordinary" use at common
law. It is an "extraordinary" use. At common law, irrigation may be pursued if there
is no sensible diminution of the stream. Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ex. 1 851 ) ;
Nagle v. Miller, 29 Vict. L.R. 765, 780-81, 10 Argus L.R. 119, 121 (1904).
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absolute legal enactment to that effect, and other eminent
lawyers hold a contrary opinion."
Whether or not riparian rights had vested, several factors made
it improbable that riparian proprietors would raise any serious objec-
tion to the Act. The statutory riparian right preserved diversions for
domestic and other "ordinary" uses known at common law. Since
"extraordinary" uses like irrigation and manufacturing were largely
underdeveloped in 1886, especially on the interior plains of Victoria,
the statutory riparian right presumably allowed most of the existing
diversions to continue unaffected by regulation.
Very few riparian rights of any description had, in fact, been
acquired in Victoria. There are three reasons for this. (A) After May
23, 1881, all river frontages on lands then owned by the Crown were
reserved to the Crown by statute:" In practice, when the lands were
sold, the Crown retained strips of land on both banks of a water-
course. These reservations prevented private acquisition of riparian
rights after that date. Acquisitions before that date were also precluded
unless the land grant described the stream as a boundary. 34 Further,
because so few Crown grants abutted on watercourses, very few
riparian rights had been acquired from the Crown before 1886. The
Commissioner of Titles once asserted that he knew of only two Crown
grants to which riparian rights were appurtenant." (B) Although by
statute private parties were entitled to claim a prescriptive right to
divert water for "extraordinary" uses on the basis of 20 years use,"
no claims for prescriptive rights were ever filed." (C) To clear up
any question about ownership of the bed, the 1905 Water Act in-
cluded a provision clearly stating that such ownership had been retain-
ed by the Crown upon alienation of the abutting Crown lands R 8 In
short, it has been accepted that riparian rights in Victoria have been
abolished and no longer exist."
32 Speech by A. Deakin, supra note 26, at 440-41.
55 River frontages were reserved under authority of the Crown Lands Act 1869,
Act No. 360, §§ 6, 7 (Vict.): Victorian Year Book 1963, Rivers and Water Resources 8
(reprint). The provision empowering the Crown to reserve river frontages had been on
the books since 1861. See Crown Lands Act 1861, Act No. 117 (Vitt.); Crown Lands
Act 1862, Act No. 145 (Viet.).
37 Crown Lands Act 1869, Act No. 360, §§ 6-7 (Viet.); L. East, Victorian Water
Law—Riparian Rights 5, 6 (c. 1949).
55 Decision of Commissioner of Titles (Vict.), 1905, re: Allotments Abutting Salt
Creek, 110 Vict. Parl. Deb. 364 (1905) ; speech by George Swinburne, Minister of Water
Supply, in support of Water Acts Consolidation and Amendment Bill, Legislative Coun-
cil, Aug. 30, 1905, 110 Vict. Parl. Deb. 1232, 1237 (1905).
39 Water Act 1905, Act No. 2016, § 15 (Vict.).
57 L. East, supra note 34, at 15-16.
38 Water Act 1905, Act No. 2016, § 5 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 5 (Vict.).
39 The situation is not so clear in New South Wales under a similar group of pro-
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Two recent High Court of Australia dicta seem to agree, suggest-
ing that the state "nationalization" statutes abolished all common
law riparian rights.' Unhappily the high court, in another case, chose
to muddy the waters somewhat. The case involved the redirection of
flood waters by a levee to lands which would otherwise remain dry.
The court held that the common law rights of nuisance and negligence
had not been abolished by the Water Rights Act 1896 (New South
Wales) or its successors.' Mr. Justice Fullagar added in unfortunate
dictum:
I should have thought . . . that the real object of the
Water Rights Act 1896 . . . was to enable the Crown, in a
country in which water is a comparatively scarce and impor-
tant commodity, to exercise full dominion over the water
of rivers and lakes and to undertake generally the conserva-
tion and distribution of water. For the attainment of that
object it was not necessary to destroy anybody's rights,
but it was necessary to give to the Crown . . . overriding
rights to which private rights must, if need arise, give way.
The effect given to the statute .. . means that a riparian
proprietor has no remedy as of right if a river is dammed by
an upper owner so that no water reaches him, or if it is
polluted and poisoned by the refuse of a factory. . . . The
view which I am disposed to take is that the Act does not
directly affect any private rights, but gives to the Crown new
rights—not riparian rights—which are superior to, and may
be exercised in derogation of, private riparian rights, but that,
until those new and superior rights are exercised, private
rights can and do co-exist with them."
visions currently enacted in Water Act 1912-1915, § 4A(1) (N.S.W.), which "national-
ized" the flow, use and control of waters in rivers and lakes and established a licensing
system very similar to Victoria's. The act establishes licensing provisions for diversions,
Water Act 1912-1966, § 10(1) (N.S.W.), except for diversions under the statutory riparian
right, id. § 7(1). Since some Crown grants in New South Wales have included the beds
of streams, and since river frontages were not reserved, L. East, supra note 34, at 9, the
question whether riparian rights attached to lands abutting streams became significant.
It was tested in 1900, when an upstream riparian's land was inundated by backup from a
downstream riparian's dam and the upstream owner brought suit, alleging his common
law riparian rights had been violated. The New South Wales Supreme Court, in Hanson
v. Grassy Gully Gold Mining Co., 21 N.S.W.L.R. (L.) 271, 275 (1900), held that the
Water Rights Act 1896, 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.W.), had taken away the old common law
rights. See also Dougherty v. Ah Lee, 19 N.S.W. Weekly N. 8 (1902); Attorney General
(N.S.W.) v. Bradney, 20 NS.W. Weekly N.247 (1903).
40 See dicta and implications in Fl. Jones & Co. v. Municipality of Kingborough,
82 Commw. L.R. 282, 342 (Austl. 1950) (Fullagar, J.); Gartner v. Kidman, 108 Commw.
L.R. 12, 23 (Austl. 1962) (Windeyer, J•)•
41 Thorpe's Ltd. v. Grant Pastoral Co., 92 Commw. L.R. 317 (Austl. 1954-55),
construing Water Rights Act 1896, 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.W.).
42 Id. at 331.
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Just what Mr. Justice Fullagar meant is not clear. If he meant
that riparian rights exist only where the Crown has not occupied the
field by legislation, and that the court should construe the licensing
statutes as such comprehensive occupying legislation, then these
statutes and the whole administrative structure built upon them have
not been weakened. His dictum; however, may suggest that he would
take a much more restrictive view of the scope of the licensing statutes.
Such an interpretation throws the meaning of the "nationalization"
provisions into doubt.
Fourth, the Irrigation Act 1886 established in Victoria a diversion
licensing system, by the terms of which a license had to be obtained
from a state agency for a diversion for any nondomestic purpose from
any watercourse, reservoir, channel or drain." All uses classed as "ex-
traordinary" or "artificial" at common law, for example, manufactur-
ing or irrigation, had to be licensed."
Licensing of diversions was not new. After 1861, certain diver-
sions had been required to be licensed by the Board of Land and
Works." What was new was licensing by a single state agency with
special competence in water supplies. This idea was borrowed from
Colorado but without the prior appropriation features." Licensing
under the Irrigation Act 1886 was first administered by the Vic-
torian Water Supply Department, and, after 1905, by the State Rivers
and Water Supply Commission. Detailed aspects of licensing are dis-
cussed later."
Fifth, the government was given power to license nonriparian
owners to condemn rights-of-way to surface water sources." The con-
cept is well known in the civil law as an "easement of aqueduct." Al-
though Deakin borrowed it from Europe and Colorado," the concept
was not unknown in Australia, the Victoria Water Conservation Act
1883 having authorized Waterworks and Irrigation Trusts, as well as
private persons to acquire "easements of aqueduct" for purposes of
that Act."
43 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 4 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958, Act
No. 6413, § 6 (Vict.). Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898, § 122 (Viet.), as reenacted, Water
Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Vict.).
44 See note 31 supra. 	 •
45 See Crown Lands Act 1861, Act No. 117, § 59 (Vict.); Crown Lands Act 1862,
Act No. 145, §§ 56-57 (Viet.); Crown Lands Act 1869, Act No. 360, §§ 46, 54-56 (Vict.);
Crown Lands Act 1884, Act No. 812, §§ 96-97, 124 (Viet.); Victorian Water Conserva-
tion Act 1881, Act No. 716, §§ 38, 41-42, 46, 48, 78.
46 A. Deakin, supra note 22, at 742.
47 See pp. 664-74 infra.
48 Irrigation Act 1886, Act No. 898,1 121 (Vict.), as reenacted, Water Act 1958,
Act No. 6413, § 203 (Vict.).
46 Spanish Law of Waters 1879, art 77; CoM. Const. art. XVI, § 7 (1876).
50 Water Conservation Act 1883, Act No. 778, § 105 (Viet.). In 1946, New South
Wales empowered the Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission to issue "easement
of aqueduct" liCenses to enable nonriparians to gain access to water. Irrigation and
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Sixth, private irrigators were empowered to organize Irrigation
Trusts. The government was authorized to make loans to these Trusts
for construction of distribution canals within the Trust districts. In
addition, the government was authorized to construct major reservoirs
and main canals to supply water to the Trust systems. Largely as a
result of the loan provisions, rapid development of irrigation began
almost at once. By 1896, over 118,000 acres had been put under
irrigation.'
Taken together these provisions of the Victorian Irrigation Act
1886 were designed to replace riparianism with a new water allocation
mechanism controlled by the state for the public benefit. The pastoral
and wheat-growing industries on the interior plains were to be fostered
by bringing to them a supplementary water supply by which small, in-
tensely watered fodder plots could be established: a kind of drought
insurance." No substantial intensification of existing land uses by
conversion to water-intensive crops, was contemplated by Deakin or
the 1886 Act's supporters. Proof of this lies in the fact that organiza-
tion of Irrigation Trusts was to be left to local initiative, and in the
fact that the government intended to supply the vast Trust districts
from the relatively small and erratic water resources of the unregulated
Goulburn and Loddon Rivers.' The irrigation schemes built under
the Act were, in fact, for supplementary irrigation."
The Irrigation Act ,1886 represented a breakthrough in thinking
in Australia, its ideas molding the thinking of irrigators and legislators
for the next 20 years. New South Wales enacted similar licensing
legislation in 1896." South Australia followed suit in 1919 with legis-
lation regulating diversions in the Murray irrigation districts."
4. Water Act 1905 (Victoria).—The Irrigation Trusts organized
under the Irrigation Act 1886 consisted of vast earthen canal systems
Water (Amendment) Act 1946, Act No. 35, § 2(1)(e) (N.S.W.), reenacted as Water
Act 1912-1966, § 13A(1) (N.S.W.).
61 Royal Comm'n on Water Supply, Report, 3 Vict. Parl. Papers 441, 555-620
(1886).
52 Rutherford, Integration of Irrigation and Dryland Farming in the Southern
Murray Basin—Part III, 28 Rev. Marketing & Agric. Econ. (N.S.W.) 97, 98, 112 (1960).
The Act's chief objective "was to assist production stability in a newly established dry-
land economy ... for wheat-sheep production . . . ." Id. at 98. The acts listed note 21
supra had much the same purpose.
53 Id. at 111.
51 Id. at 112; sec E. Mead, Helping Men to Own Farms 30 (1920).
55 Water Rights Act 1896, 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.W.), as currently enacted, Water Act
1912-1966 (N.S.W.). That Act did not provide for construction of headworks by the
government.
56 Control of Waters Act 1919, Act No. 1359 (So. Austl.), as reenacted, Control of
Waters Act, 1919-1925 (So. Austl.). The Act applies only to the lands bordering the
River Murray above Mannum to the easten border with Victoria and New South Wales.
It "nationalizes" water rights, abolishes riparian rights, and provides for diversion licenses.
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supplying small quantities of water to scattered locations. They were
often over-capitalized and under-utilized and their reservoirs were in-
adequate during extended droughts. Wheat farmers and graziers took
water only during droughts and thus reduced Trust revenues during
wetter seasons. Local managements could not or would not levy
charges large enough to defray operating and capital expenses. By
1905 the Irrigation Trusts were insolvent." To protect its investment of
/6 million in irrigation headwork and loans, Victoria abolished all Irri-
gation Trusts by enacting the Water Act 1905; the State took over
all operation and management of the irrigation systems and placed
them in the control of the newly formed State Rivers and Water
Supply Commission."
Two other major policy changes were made by this Act. First,
the government decided to effect a substantial intensification of land
and water use, converting certain wheat-farming areas to vineyards
and fruit orchards. Additional storages and distribution canals would
be constructed to provide an enlarged and more stable water supply.
Second, to achieve a more intensive use of water on existing irrigated
farms and to bring unirrigated areas served by channels into the sys-
tem, a "compulsory water right" was introduced. Each farm was
assigned a certain volume of water per acre for which a charge was
levied whether or not the water was used."
The Water Act 1905 clearly contemplated substantial resettle-
ment as a result of the government's new policy to intensify land and
water use. It was conceived as the "handmaiden" to Victoria's Closer
Settlement Act 1904, 00 which had been introduced into Parliament
at the same time." The latter act provided for condemnation of large
estates, subdivisions into family-sized farms, and sale to selected
applicants.
. 57 See Rutherford, supra note 52, at 111-12; Royal Comm'n on Water Supply,
Report, 3 Wet. Pad. Papers 441, 626 (1896).
58 Water Act 1905, Act No. 2016 (Vict.).
59 Id. § 56 (Vict.). This idea was proposed by George Swinburne, Minister of Water
Supply, after his tour of irrigation areas in 1904. Churchyard, Pioneers of Irrigation in
Victoria—George Swinburne, 8 Aqua (Viet.) 123, 124 (1957).
The compulsory water right is not unknown in the United States. Under legisla-
tion enacted in 1914, compulsory payment for one acre-foot of water per acre of land
irrigated was required in all irrigation areas under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Reclamation. Reclamation Act of 1914, § 5, 38 Stat. 686, 43 U.S.C. § 492 (1964).
Elwood Mead, soon to administer the new Water Act, had advocated the com-
pulsory water charge in 1903. E. Mead, Irrigation Institutions 25-26 (1903). He based his
ideas on the Carey Act, 28 Stat. 422 (1894), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 641 (1964); and
the reclamation of Carey Act lands statutes of Idaho and Wyoming. Idaho Code §§ 42-
2009, -2011, -2026, -2028 (1948) ; Wyo. Stat. 66 36-115 to -121 (1959).
65 Closer Settlement Act 1904, Act No. 1962 (Viet.).
61 Speech by George Swinburne, Minister of Water Supply, in support of Water
Acts Consolidation and Amendment Bill, Legislative Assembly, Oct. 4, 1904, 108 Vict.
Parl. Deb. 1937, 1954 (1904).
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Taken together, the two acts made possible the tripartite policy
advocated by George Swinburne, Minister of Water Supply:
(1) Water should be used in compact areas
(2) As landowners were not prepared to subdivide land so
that water could be used in compact areas, the Govern-
ment should purchase land and subdivide and dispose
of it under the Closer Settlement Act.
(3) The compulsory charge should be based on the delivery
of a certain quantity of water, the quantity to each farm
to be determined from the area of commanded land not
unsuitable for irrigation.°
Elwood Mead, an irrigation expert and later Commissioner of
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,63 was hired in 1907 as Chairman of
the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission of Victoria to imple-
ment these policies. He, too, had advocated intensive land and water
use and irrigation of compact areas.° Very quickly he initiated a
large-scale program of closer settlement based on irrigation° which
has been continued to this day. These vast areas stand as a monu-
ment to Mead's development of pragmatic methods to implement the
policies embodied in the Water Act 1905 and the Closer Settlement
Act 1904.66
S. Murrumbidgee Irrigation Areas 1912 (New South Wales).—In
New South Wales, "nationalization" of water and licensing of diver-
sions had occurred under the Water Rights Act 1896." These pro-
visions had eliminated the armed conflicts over water which had
occurred in the Riverina pastoral district before that time, but did
nothing to foster large-scale irrigation." After several years of investi-
gation and thought, the government decided to embark on a large-
scale irrigation project •utilizing the waters of the Murrumbidgee
River and regulated by a large storage reservoir upstream. Construc-
tion began in 1906, land for the irrigated blocks was acquired between
62 Aird, Water Rights, 8 Aqua (Viet.) 99, 101 (1957).
63 From 1924 to 1936. Mead had previously been Chief Engineer of Wyoming Terri-
tory and a professor of irrigation engineering at Stanford University.
64 See, e.g., E. Mead, supra note 59.
65 The area irrigated rose from 86,192 acres in 1909-10 to 151,232 acres in 1912-13.
State Rivers & Water Supply Comm'n (Vict.), Annual Report 1912-13, 3 Viet. Pad.
Papers 288 (1913-14).
416 Mead left the Commission in 1915. He brought the Victorian formula back to
the United States where he was influential in securing land use legislation.
64 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.W.).
68 5 U.S. Dept of State, Special Consular Reports—Canals and Irrigation in For-
eign Countries 382 (1891).
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1910 and 1912," and the first 300 settlers took possession of their
blocks in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Areas in 1912."
This New South Wales project differed from the Victoria irriga-
tion systems in several important respects. It was a new irrigation
system located on virgin pastureland, not a rehabilitation of an exist-
ing system. It was a large, planned, integrated System, composed of
storage works, large distribution canals and various sized blocks for
alfalfa, dairying, fruit trees and market gardens." Towns, railway
lines, roads, electricity and a canning factory were provided. The
existing large sheep stations were condemned, and the irrigation sys-
tem substituted.' Irrigation blocks were leased, not sold." Land use,
tenure and transfer were tightly controlled. All the planning, purchas-
ing, construction, distribution, operation, financing and closer settle-
ment functions were centralized in a special state agency, which was
later replaced by the present Water Conservation and Irrigation
Commission." It was, in fact, a gigantic land reform and coloniza-
tion scheme to populate empty land and to make it intensely pro-
ductive."
The scheme sought to avoid the two major shortcomings of the
09 By the summer of 1912, the state had compulsorily acquired, in Australian
parlance "resumed," about 229,659 acres in the Vane° and Mirrool areas of the Riverina
north of the Murrumbidgee River and about 100 miles below Wagga Wagga. 1 C. King,
An Outline of Closer Settlement in New South Wales 232 (1957). Today the Murrum-
bidgee Irrigation Areas are focused on the towns of Griffith and Leeton.
7° Id.
77 Construction of works was authorized by the Barren Jack Dam and Murrum-
bidgee Canals Construction Act 1906, Act No. 46 (N.S.W.).
72 Condemnation of land was authorized by the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area
Resumption Act 1910, Act No. 13 (N.S.W.).
73 Labour Governments in New South Wales traditionally have been attracted by
the ideas of Henry. George. See M. Clark, A Short History of Australia 164 (1963). Cf.
H. George, Progress and Poverty 442 (Schalkenbach Foundation ed. 1956). As a result
they have preferred to lease rather than sell Crown lands in order to retain the unearned
increment of value for the state. A Labour Government came into power in 1913 and
adopted a general policy to lease all Crown lands thereafter. The Conservative Govern-
ment elected in 1924 reversed this policy, and permitted conversion of lease to land sale
contracts. Subsequent changes of governments have resulted in giving blockholders the
right to convert from land contracts to leases or the reverse, Today there are 88 different
types of Crown Lands Act tenures in New South Wales, variously under control of the
Department of Lands, the Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission, and the Western
Lands Commissioner. 1 C. King, supra note 69, at 260.
74 Administration of the Areas was established under the Murrumbidgee Irrigation
Act 1910, Act No. 42 (N.S.W.). The areas initially were administered by a tripartite
Trust representing the Departments of Public Works, Lands, and Agriculture. It was re-
placed by the present Commission in 1912. Irrigation Act 1912, Act No. 73 (N.S.W.).
Provisions relating to New South Wales irrigation systems are found in the Irrigation Act
1912-1959 (N.S.W.), and Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1967, II 137-147N (N.
SW.).
75 In 1967 the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Areas encompassed 451,263 acres contain-
ing 2163 blocks, 326,390 acres of which are irrigated. Water Conservation & Irrigation
Comm'n (N.S.W.), Annual Report for the year ended 30th June, 1967, at 80.
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Victorian experience, local control and inadequate storages. It did,
however, borrow several features of that experience—closer settlement
methods to populate the land, intensive use of water on areas irrigated,
and the compulsory charge for water whether used or not.
6. Later Developments.—The Victorian and New South Wales experi-
ences of the early decades of the 20th Century set the pattern which
has been followed in Australia ever since. Only minor alterations have
been introduced in later years.
a. Soldier Settlement 1920-1930. After World War I the irriga-
tion authorities continued the closer settlement activities which had
been begun in several locations in Victoria and South Australia, and in
the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Areas of New South Wales. These post-
war activities differed from the earlier efforts in two respects. First,
the bulk of the settlers were returned soldiers with no experience in
irrigated farming and no capital to contribute to the development of
their farms. Second, all three states followed the recommendations of
Elwood Mead, irrigating nearly all of the agricultural blocks (and
these were small: often not larger than 50 acres). These settlements
accounted for a doubling of the irrigated area in these states in the
1920's, and created a large volume of fruit and dairy produce for
export, so that Australia shifted from a net importer to a net exporter
of these products. The settlements supported the growth of a host of
small country towns and created a relatively dense rural population on
family farms.
Unhappily, this growth and development was achieved at great
financial cost to the irrigators and to the states. The heavy debt com-
mitment of state loans borrowed by the irrigators at high interest
rates just after World War I could not be repaid after the collapse of
market prices in 1923. The new irrigators were inexperienced and
could not make the best of the conditions under which they operated.
The settlements proved to be inadequately planned. Many blocks
had been located on poor soils, crops were often unsuited to the
soils, natural drainage proved inadequate and no provision had been
made for artificial drainage. As a result blocks were ruined by salting
of the soils or waterlogging. Most blocks were too small to provide
sufficient income to support a family.'°
The states eventually accepted the principle of the "home mainten-
ance area," which requires that blocks be large enough to earn an
income sufficient to support a family, and began a process of con-
solidating blocks into larger units. In the 1930's, the Depression
greatly accelerated the accumulation of arrearages in payments by
76 On the problems of the 1920's, see generally 1 C. King, supra note 69, at 236-39,
254-55; Rutherford, supra note 52, at 122-24, 131-32, 141-45.
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settlers, and the process of cancelling the major portion of settlers'
debts began. Very little development of these intensely irrigated areas
continued after 1930, since the period was devoted to readjustment of
existing settlements.
b. 'Supplementary Irrigation in New South Wales 1930-1940.
Also in the 1930's, New South Wales, deviating from its policy of de-
veloping small irrigated blocks, brought water supplies as a form of
drought protection to a large area along the River Murray. Only one
acre in ten was to be watered, as a form of supplementary irrigation."
This region was divided into several sparsely irrigated Irrigation
Districts, which are distinguished from the intensely irrigated Irriga-
tion Areas.
• 
c. Prior Appropriation in New South Wales 1930-1946. Prior
appropriation was adopted in New South Wales in 1930" in order
to create a more secure water right in times of shortage. It was
adopted at the recommendation of Elwood Mead," on the basis of
his long experience with irrigation in the western United States.
Prior appropriation followed the maxim "first in time, first in
right," by which licenses are given priority of right on the basis of date
of application. During shortages, licensees would be cut off in inverse
order of date of application, the holder of the most recent license being
cut off first." The new doctrine replaced the old procedure whereby
during shortages the state would proportionately reduce allotments to
all licensees." The New South Wales prior appropriation system
adopted use preferences similar to those in some jurisdictions of the
United States." All licenses in a superior class would be given priority,
regardless of date, over all licenses in an inferior class." The order of
preference classes was:
Class I: domestic, municipal, and railway water supplies and
water supplies needed for hydropower stations;
Class II: all other purposes, including manufacturing and
many forms of irrigation, except those in Class III;
and
Class III: irrigating pastureland."
77 Rutherford, supra note 52, at 145-47.
78 Water (Amendment) Act 1930, Act No. 15, § 2(n) (N.S.W.).
79 See E. Mead, Memorandum respecting Allocation of Murray Waters, and Amend-
ments to Laws Governing Water Rights, 3 N.S.W. Parl. Papers 1115, 1117 (1923).
89 For a discussion of prior appropriation as it is practiced in the western United
States, see pp. 688-97 infra.
81 Water Act 1912-1924, §§ 6-18 (N.S.W.).
82 See discussion at pp. 673-74 infra.
83 Water Act 1912-1930, §§ 1811(1), (2), (3) (N.S.W.).
81 Id. § 18B(2).
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Holders of existing licenses were given 12 months to apply for
new appropriation licenses which would be of equal preference and
senior to all subsequent license applications." Licenses applied for
later, however, would be subject within each class to an order of
preferences based upon date of application."
The Commission eventually found that so many of these early
equal-priority licenses had been secured that it was unable to ad-
minister the prior appropriation system effectively. Also, irrigators had
a tendency to seek licenses for larger volumes of water than they
could use.
In 1946 New South Wales abandoned prior appropriation because
it had proved to be unworkable.' It returned to a nonpriority permit
system and adopted "beneficial use" classifications for various irriga-
tion diversion licenses." Beneficial use was defined as irrigation of
improved pasture or higher-value crops. Three classes of beneficial
use were created:- (in order of priority) (1) diversions at least five
years old, (2) diversions at least three years old, and (3) new diver-
sions. These classifications were to be used for cutting off various
licensees in time of shortage. They are, in effect, use preference classi-
fications for irrigation, giving greater security to well-established irri-
gators growing high-value crops."
d. Closer Settlement Since 1945. After World War II, the states
again 'engaged in rapid development of irrigated closer settlements,
drawing upon returned soldiers as settlers. The errors of earlier closer
and soldier settlements were avoided as much as possible. Planning
was advanced. Blocks were designed to be sufficiently large to provide
an adequate income, and were located on suitable soils. Drainage sys-
tems were installed. Markets for products were analyzed. Most of
the capital costs of the water distribution systems were assumed by
the states. Adequate training was given to the new settlers. Because
market prices have held up since 1945, these post-war settlements
promise to be financial successes.
At the present time New South Wales is vigorously pursuing a
course of enlarging its intensively irrigated settlements, especially in
the new Coleambally Irrigation Area. Victoria is making larger
amounts of water available to existing areas, and is developing the
Murray Valley Irrigation Area, but is planning no new expansion at
85 Id. § 18B (5).
80 Id.
87 Second Reading Motion Speech by Cap't W.F. Dunn, Minister for Conservation,
in support of Irrigation and Water (Amendment) Bill, Legislative Assembly, Mar. 21,
1946, 180 N.S.W. Parl. Deb. 1d 2839, 2842-43 (1945-46).
88 Irrigation and Water (Amendment) Act 1946, Act No. 35, § 20)(k) (N.S.W.),
reenacted as Water Act 1912-1960, §§ ISA-E (N.S.W.).
89 See the discussion of this classification systent at p. 674 infra.
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present. No state development is underway in South Australia, but
several large private spray irrigation projects have been developed
there in the past decade." Private diversions are expanding rapidly in
Victoria and New South Wales as well."
7. Conclusion.—In two major steps in 1886 and 1905 and legal em-
bellishments at other times, Victoria and New South Wales have set
the pattern for water use development in Australia. This pattern has
six major elements:
(1) Abolition of common law riparian rights;
(2) substitution of a licensing procedure for all diversions
except those for domestic, stock water, and small garden
uses; 92
(3) adequate provision of regulated water supplies by con-
struction of large storage reservoirs;
(4) conversion of areas from dryland farming or supple-
mentary irrigation to intensive irrigation by one or more
of the following methods:
(a) compulsory water charge for a minimum quantity
of water whether used or not,
(b) land redistribution for the purpose of closer settle-
ment;
(5) control of water diversions, land use and irrigation sys-
tems by a central state agency; and
(6) financing of capital costs of headworks and distribution
canals for soldier settlements out of the state general
revenue.
As a result, in 1966 in southeastern Australia nearly 2,700,000 acres
were under irrigation." Australian irrigation policy seems to be based
on three assumptions:
(1) Water should be used to support the most productive
agriculture per unit of land;
(2) cheap water will promote high usage of water, per acre;
and
90 On post-war development, see 1 C. King, supra note 69, at 256-59; Rutherford,
supra note 52, at 126, 148-50.
91 In Victoria, private diversions have grown from 36,700 to 150,000 acres since
1945. Venables, Private Irrigation Schemes, 18 Aqua (Vict.) 192, 197 (1967).
02 For a discussion of aspects of licensing, see pp. 664-74 infra.
93 For information on irrigated areas in Australia, see generally Commonwealth
Bureau of Census & Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No.
53, at 1007, 1011, 1014 (1967); State Rivers & Water Supply Comm'n (Vict.), Fifty-
Seventh Annual Report 1961-62, at 99; Lyrup Village Ass'n, Brief History of the Lyrup
Village Settlement under the Village Settlement Act 1903, at 4 (typescript reprint, un-
dated).
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(3) such intensive use of water is its most efficient and
beneficial use.
While these assumptions are open to challenge, there is no doubt that
they are regarded as being responsible for Australia's flourishing irri-
gation areas today."
B. Licenses and Permits for Private Diversions Outside
Organized Irrigation Areas
About 22 percent of the irrigated acreage in Victoria, South
Australia and New South Wales is located outside organized govern-
ment or private irrigation areas' and is watered under licenses issued
to individual diverters. These licenses are obtained from the respec-
tive state agencies: in Victoria, from the State Rivers and Water
Supply Commission (Melbourne); in New South Wales, from the
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (Sydney); and in
South Australia, from the Engineering and Water Supply Department
(Adelaide).
The following discussion concerns the licensing systems estab-
lished in those Australian states. The concepts developed to underpin
this system have relevance to the water allocation issues emerging in
the eastern United States today—a licensing system being a feasible
alternative to the general American system of allocation by vested
private rights. The law of these license areas is distinct from that of
irrigation areas and is a subject suitable for another study."
94 See E. Mead, supra note 59; E. Mead, supra note 54. Maximum productivity per
acre has been accepted unreservedly by engineers and agronomists as the best goal in
agricultural production, and politicians have seen no reason to question this approach,
according to Rutherford. Interview with J. Rutherford, Dep't of Geography, Univ. of
Sydney, Sydney, N.S.W., Aug. I, 1963.
The validity of these assumptions has been challenged by economists. See T. Lang-
ford-Smith & J. Rutherford, Water and Land Two Case Studies in Irrigation 125-254
(1966) ; Rutherford, Integration of Irrigation and Dryland Farming in the Southern
Murray Basin—Part I: Need for Reappraising the Concept, 26 Rev. Marketing & Agric.
Econ. (N.S.W.) 227 (1958), Part II: Results of Research in a "Field Study Area" 1956-
58, 27 id. 146 (1959), Part III: Evolution of Integration and Some Lessons for the
Future, 28 id. 97 (1960).
"5 Out of the 2,699,935 acres irrigated in these states, 608,300 acres are supplied
under diversion licenses. See authorities cited note 93 supra.
96 Inside organized government irrigation areas, a sizable portion of the water is
supplied under a "compulsory water right." This is the quantity of water assigned to the
irrigation block. In Victoria it is one acre-foot for each three acres. It must be paid for
whether used or not. Rarely does the "compulsory water right" provide enough water, and
more may be purchased at cost. Land transfer, subdivision and consolidation are strictly
controlled to maintain the existence of family-sized irrigation blocks. In Victoria this is
done by controlling the disposition of the "water right." In South Australia and New
South Wales, the agency leases the irrigation blocks and can control their disposition as
well. Forfeiture of water rights or leases may result from wasteful use of the land or
excessive defaulting on payments for water, rent, land contract installments, or install-
ments on Crown development loans. Irrigation inside organized irrigation areas is con-
trolled respectively by the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (Vitt.), the Water
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Discussion of licensing procedures in Victoria, South Australia,
and New South Wales will first deal with the more formalized matters,
such as the types of diversions which must be licensed, conditions
attached to licenses, fees and the term of the license. Then matters
involving administrative discretion will be discussed: criteria for
granting or denying license applications, protection of existing uses,
restrictions in times of shortage and termination of licenses.
1. General Provisions.-The licensing provisions of the Australian
water acts not only "nationalize" the waters of the respective states,"
they prohibit the acquisition of rights to water by prescription" and
suits for injury to riparian rights between licensed diverters." Licens-
ing of all diversions is required' with the following exceptions:
(1) diversions for domestic and stock water supplies;"
(2) diversions for irrigating small gardens?"'
(3) storage at dams and tanks designed to retain surface
runoff, provided the flow of water in any watercourse is
not sensibly diminished;"
(4) taking water for domestic purposes (e.g., by bucket)
and watering stock at watercourses where there is access
by public road or public frontage reserve;" and
Conservation and Irrigation Commission (N.S.W.), and the Department of Lands, Irri-
gation Branch (So. Austl.). See generally Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413 (Vict.); Irriga-
tion Act 1930-1946 (So. Austl.) ; Irrigation Act 1912-1959 (N.S.W.).
97 Water Act 1912-1966, § 4A(1) (N.S.W.) ; Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 4(1)
(Viet.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, § 4(1) (So. Austl.), which applies only to
the River Murray from Mannum to the eastern border. Id. § 30). No other watercourses
have been proclaimed as coming under the Act. Letter from J.R. Dridan, Director &
Engineer in Chief, Engineering & Water Supply Dep't (So. Austl.) to author, Aug. 4,
1965.
1. 8 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 8 (Via.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ 9 (So. Austl.).
" E.g., Water Rights Act 1896, 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.W.); Hanson v. Grassy
Gully Gold Mining Co., 21 N.S.W.L.R. (L.) 271 (1900).
100 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, §§ 6, 204 (Vitt.); Control of Waters Act 1919-
1925, §§ 8, 15(1) (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, § 10 (N.S.W.).
101 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 14 (Vict.) (only by owners of land alienated
from the Crown before Dec. 15, 1886); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, § 7 (So.
Austl.) ; Water Act 1912-1966, § 70) (N.S.W.).
102 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 14 (Vict.) (5 acres); Control of Waters Act
1919-1925, § 8(3) (b) (So. Austl.) (1 acre) ; Water Act 1912-1966, § 7(1) (N.S.W.) (5
acres).
103 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 4(2), as amended by Water Act 1964, Act No.
7198, § 2(a) (Viet.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, § 4(2) (So. Austl.) ; Water Act
1912-1966, § 5 (N.S.W.) (dams and tanks on watercourses only).
These provisions probably are the result of several cases which allow the capture
of diffused surface water before it reaches a watercourse. E.g., Taylor v. St. Helens
Corp., 6 Ch. D. 264 (1877).
104 Water Act 1958, Act. No. 6413, § 6 (Vict.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ A(1) (So. Austl.). This type of provision is not unknown in the United States. See
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 42-311 (1964); N.M. Stat. Ann. 75 - 1 -4 (1968).
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(5) diversions for mining purposes made under authority of
a miner's right?"
The administering agency is not required to grant an application for
a license.'" The statutes do not provide any criteria for the granting
or denial of a license.
A license gives the licensee a right to divert water and to con-
struct ditches on any Crown land as specified in the license.'" A special
easement license is available to enable nonriparian licensees to con-
struct diversion ditches across property owned by others to obtain
access to the water.'" The diversion license is not personal to the
licensee, but inures to the benefit of the lawful owner or occupier
of the land where the water is licensed to be used.'" As a result, the
water must be used on the designated land, and a transfer of the
right to divert to another location can be accomplished only by obtain-
ing a new license.
2. Conditions of License.-Typically a license has a number of con-
ditions regulating how it is to be used. Generally the state agencies
may impose any conditions they see fit.'w Conditions frequently im-
posed control the location and size of the land to be irrigated, the
purpose to which the water will be put, and the size and location of
the diversion?" For example, in New South Wales, new licenses for
pumping from the River Murray are restricted to a maximum of 400
acres. Licenses for irrigating vines or citrus trees are for a maximum of
50 acres. But older licenses for larger areas customarily are renewed?'
108 Water Act 1958, Act. No. 6413, § 6 (Viet.) ; Mines Act 1958, Act No. 6320,
§ 15(2) (Viet.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, § 8(1) (So. Austl.); Mining Act 1930-
1957, §§ 30(a), 96-108 (So. Austl.). The New South Wales Act does not require licenses
for diversions for mining purposes. Water Act 1912-1966, § 10(1) (N.S.W.) ; Mining Act
1906-1967, § 15(1) (f) (N.S.W.).
106 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Viet.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ 16(1) (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, §§ 11(3)(a), 12(1)(a) (N.S.W.).
107 Water Act 1958. Act No. 6413, § 204 (Viet.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ 17(1) (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, § 17 (N.S.W.).
1°8 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 203 (Vict.); Water Act 1912-1966, 1 13A(1)
(N.S.W.). This is the civil law "easement of aqueduct." See p. 655 supra.
109 This doctrine applies only in New South Wales. Water Act 1912-1966, U 16,
18Q (N.S.W.). In Victoria the license, which generally empowers the licensee to use
water on particular land, is a transferable chattel interest. Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413,
§ 204 (Wet.).
110 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, §§ 204, 206 (Viet.); Control of Waters Act 1919-
1925, § 16 (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, § 120)(a) (N.S.W.).
111 Water Act 1912-1966, § 13B(1) (N.S.W.); Regulations under Control of Waters
Acts 1919-1925, Sch. B, license, conditions 1-3 (So. Austl. Gaz., Oct. 25, 1934); Victoria
License to Divert Water and Cut Race, conditions 1-3, 6 (Form W.D.L. 7). See Venables,
supra note 91, at 193.
112 Interview with A. Jensen, Dist. Eng'r, Berriquin Irrigation Dist., Water Con-
servation & Irrigation Comm'n, Finley, N.S.W., Oct. 30, 1963.
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Beneficial application of water is required and waste is prohibited."'
In order to cope with a water shortage or other emergency, the state
agencies are given authority to revoke, modify or suspend licenses.'"
These license conditions give the state agencies great power to direct
land and water development according to their desires.
3. Fees for Licenses.—In Victoria and New South Wales, a relatively
low charge is levied for the volume of water actually diverted under a
license or annual permit."' In Victoria; meters often are installed to
measure this volume," 6 but the charge for the volume of the licensed
diversion is paid whether or not the diversion is 'actually made."' This
charge is similar in principle to the "compulsory water charge" levied
inside irrigation areas.
4. Term of License.—The mainland Australian states have uni-
formly adopted a policy of issuing licenses for relatively short terms
of years. In Victoria, the term of a diversion license may not exceed
15 years."' In practice, the initial term of a new license is four years,
and subsequent renewal terms will be for the full 15 years."' Renewal
is not automatic.' Application for renewal would be denied if the
licensee were not taking the water licensed.'" Since 1909 an annual
permit has also been available.'
Licenses in Victoria are normally issued for diversions from
streams in which the summer flow is maintained by releases from
storage reservoirs or from streams where there is an assured natural
summer flow, and only to the extent diversions can safely be made in a
season of below-average stream flows. Permits (permissions for diver-
sion for one year or less) are issued for all other diversions, such as
diversions drawing on nonassured streamflows, off-season diversions,
or diversions for limited periods."' While annual permits are not auto-
113 Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1)(c) (N.S.W.) Control of Waters Act 1912-
1925, § 18(1) (b) (So. Austl.) ; Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race, condi-
tions 2, 6 (Form W.D.L. 7).
114 Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(2) (N.S.W.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ 18(1)(c) (So. Austl.); Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race, condition 8
(Form W.D.L. 7). See discussion of restrictions in times of shortage at pp. 673-74 infra.
113 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, §§ 204, 206 (Vict.); Control of Waters Act 1919-
1925, § 16(2) (So. Austl.) ; Water Act 1912-1966, §§ 14A, I4B (N.S.W.).
110 Supply of water by measure is authorized by Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § t86
117 Water Act 1912-1966, § 14B(2)(e) (N.S.W.); Interview with J.R.C. Venables,
Superintendent of Water Distribution, State Rivers & Water Supply Comm'n Melborne,
Vict., June 21, 1963.
its Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Vict.).
112 Venables, supra note 91, at 193-94.
122 Id.
121 Aird, Water Rights, 8 Aqua (Vict.) 99, 104 (1957).
122 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Viet.).
123 Venables, supra note 91,at 194.
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matically renewable, many people have come to feel that holding a
permit for an unbroken succession of years confers some sort of right
to continued renewal.' The Commission feels some sort of informal
obligation to renew licenses and permits unless special circumstances
exist, but it denies a duty to do so.
South Australian licenses for diversions from the River Murray
are issued by the Engineering and Water Supply Department. The
term of the license is one year.125 Licenses and annual permits in New
South \Vales are issued by the Water Conservation and Irrigation
Commission. The term of a license may not exceed 10 years,'" and in
practice the Commission usually grants licenses for periods not ex-
ceeding five years.'' Short term permits are available for irrigation
of areas not exceeding 10 acres.' Such permits may have a maximum
period of two years,' but, in practice, the Commission issues annual
permits.'" While licenses and annual permits may not be renewed of
right, 13 ' the Commission generally renews them unless circumstances
and conditions have changed.'"
5. Criteria for Granting or Denying Applications for Licenses and
Renewals.—The state agencies, then, are under no duty to renew li-
censes or to grant them."' Since the statutes provide no standards for
the granting or denying of applications for licenses and renewals, the
state irrigation agencies have been given great administrative discre-
tion in making such determinations.
Several basic questions of policy exist within the scope of this
discretion. These include the problems of determining when there is
water available for new uses, by whom and where it should be used,
the type of agriculture or other economic activity to be promoted,
which of conflicting applications for licenses to grant, and when to
refuse applications for license renewals either because water is needed
for new uses or because the licensee is using water improperly. Very
little has appeared in the literature, been decided by the courts, or
124 Aird, supra note 121, at 104-05. One olive orchard on the River Murray has
diverted water under annual permits since 1911. Interview with J.R.C. Venables, supra
note 117.
125 The term is set under authority of Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, § 16(2) (So.
Austl.).
120 Water Act 1912-1966, § 12(3) (N.S.W.).
127 Interview with A.J. Muir, Engineer, Water Rights Section, Water Conservation &
Irrigation Comm'n, Sidney, N.S.W., July 24, 1963.
128 Water Act 1912-1966, § 18F (N.S.W.).
128 Id. § 18J.
135 Interview with A.J. Muir, supra note 127.
131 See Water Act 1912-1966, § 14(1) (N.S.W.).
1 :12 Interview with A.J. Muir, supra note 127. 	 •
133 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Vitt.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ 17(1) (So. Austl.) ; Water Act 1912-1966, .4 17 (N.S.W.).
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been defined by regulations on these matters. Hence, the following
discussion on aspects of these problems must, of necessity, be spotty.'
Licenses are granted only when water is available for diversion.
Such water exists if the flow in a stream has not been fully allocated,
if improved regulation has increased the minimum flow in a stream, or
if additional supplies have been created from new storage reservoirs.
Generally, the last technique has caused substantial increases in
private diversions since World War II. In Victoria between 10 and 20
percent of the new supplies made available from the Big Eildon
Reservoir, the Snowy River diversion, and smaller reservoirs have been
allocated to private diversions.135 Substantial increases in private di-
versions have occured in South Australia as a result of surplus water
in and improved regulation of the River Murray. This growth may be
expected to continue as the increased supplies from Chowilla Reser-
voir, now under construction, becomes available. Private irrigation in
New South Wales can be expected to increase as supplies from several
new reservoirs and from the Snowy River diversion are allocated. As a
result of this growth, private irrigation has become relatively more
important than in the past, especially in South Australia. It con-
stitutes 22Y2 percent of all irrigated acreage in the three states com-
bined,' 15 percent in Victoria,' 37 26 percent in New South Wales'
and 63 percent in South Australia 139 While the state irrigation agen-
cies do promote private irrigation, nowhere have they indicated the
basis on which they decide how much will be allocated to each ap-
plicant. In general, along what reaches of streams private diversions
will be allowed and what types of agriculture will be promoted are
political determinations within the range of choices imposed by phys-
ical conditions.
What information does exist on administrative discretion comes,
not from the statutes,n° but from court appeals from administrative
decisions. Appeals from license and renewal conditions and denials
have been published only in New South Wales.'
134 On the scope of administrative discretion generally in Australia, see D. Benja-
field & H. Whitmore, Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3d ed. 1966).
135 Venables, supra note 91, at 200.
136 See note 95 supra.
137 188,267 acres out of 1,262,661 acres in 1965-66. See authorities cited note 93
supra.
138 338,427 acres out of 1,308,439 acres in 1965-66. See authorities cited note 93
supra.
139 81,606 acres out of 128,835 acres in 1965-66. See authorities cited note 93 supra.
115 Robson v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, 36 Land& Val. Ct. 57, 60
(N.S.W. 1955) ; Gibralter Pty. Ltd. v. Fairymead Sugar Co., 36 Land & Val. Ct. 32, 38
(N.S.W. 1957).
141 Appeals from decisions of the Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission may
be made to the Local Land Board or a police magistrate, and then to the Land and Valua-
tion Court. Water Act 1912-1966, i§ 11(4)-(6) (N.S.W.). Theie are no statutory pro-
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The decision whether, to grant or deny an application for, or to
place conditions on, a license or renewal in New South Wales is based
on the "public interest."'" What constitutes "public interest" has
never been defined in the cases, although a reading of them discloses
these components:
(1) A known advantage or benefit to one or more riparian
landholders must be balanced against an apprehended or
possible disadvantage or prejudice to other riparian
landholders" or to the public.'"
(2) A more equitable distribution and beneficial use of water
should be promoted."
(3) The Commission's ability to control its own flow-regu-
tion works should not be affected prejudicially. 1413
(4) Landholders should be encouraged to conserve water.'
(5) The greater public interest or public benefit should be
served.'
There are two cases which illustrate this last component. In one
case, an irrigation scheme for growing fodder crops for commercial
sale was held to be in the public interest because it benefited the
rural economy. The diversion was approved even though the appli-
cant would get more than his equitable share of a limited water
visions concerning appeals from admingtrative •decisions by the state irrigation agencies
in Victoria and South Australia, but under the common law such decisions are review-
able. See D. Benjafield & H. Whitmore, supra note 134, at 171-97. Judicial review is im-
pliedly recognized by Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, 330(2) (Viet.), which states that
by-laws made by the Commission or other statutory authority may not be impeached
in any court of petty sessions or before justices.
142 Braithwaite v. Shoalhaven Shire-Council, 44 Land & Val. Ct. 5, 8 (N.S.W. 1965) ;
Water Conservation & Irrigation Comrnin. v: New South Wales Pastoral Co., 24 Land &
Val. Ct. 54, 57 (N.S.W. 1945) ; F.W. Hughes ,Pty Ltd. v. Water Conservation & Irriga-
tion Commin, 16 Land & Val. Ct. 11, 16-18 (N.S.W. 1937).
143 Farrant v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, 37 Land & Val. Ct. 30,
34-35 (N.S.W. 1958) ; Gibralter Pty. Ltd. v/Fairymead Sugar Co., 36 Land & Val. Ct.
32, 38 (N.S.W. 1957) ; Robson v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Commix', 36 Land &
Val. Ct. 57, 60 (N.S.W. 1955) ; Thorpes Ltd. N. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n,
36 Land & Val. Ct. 62, 66 (N.S.W.19511.52) ; Bathtirst Pastures Protection Bd. v. Kyalla
Inv. Co., 21 Land & Val. Ct. 8, 12 (N.S.W. 1942) ; Estate of Smith Pollock v. Considine,
20 Land & Val. Ct. 8,22-23 (NS.W. 1941).
144 Thorpes Ltd. v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, 36 Land & Val. Ct.
62, 66 (N.S.W. 1951-52) ; F.W. Hughes Pty. Ltd. v. Water Conservation & Irrigation
Comm'n;.16 Land & Val. Ct: 11, 16-17 -(N:S.W. 1937).
145 B.W. Role Partnership v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Commin, [1964-651
N.S.W.R. 1848, 82 N.S.W. Weekly N. '577, 588 (Land & Val. Ct. 1964) ; Water Act 1912-
1966, § 4A(1) (N.S.W.). 1
145 Bathurst Pastures Protection Bd. v. kyalli Iriv. Co.; 21 Land & Val. Ct. 8, 12
(N.S.W. 1942).
747, Id. at 12.
14p See Water Conservation & Irrigation Corninin v. New South Wales Pastoral Co.,
-24 Land & Val. et. 54; 56-57 (N.S.W. 1945)..,
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supply. The license contained conditions which would protect down-
stream riparian landholders." In the other case, a dam for an
urgently needed public water supply was preferred to preserving an
unused alluvial goldfield for possible resumption of mining in the
future.'
It is clear that an application for a license for a use no greater
than an alternative means which does not require licensing should
be granted.' But in most cases, the discretion of the Commission in
determining whether a license or renewal should be granted, with or
without conditions, is wide. In a New South Wales case, Thorpes Ltd.
v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Connn'n,' the court said:
The discretion entrusted to the Commission by the
Statute is so wide, and the considerations which may arise
are so various, that any suggestion of the fettering of that
discretion by rules should be avoided. The Commission's
functions are not confined to the administration of the licens-
ing provisions of the Water Act. Under that and other legis-
lation they extend over a wide field of inter-related subject
matters, and the Commission is thus peculiarly well situ-
ated, by experience and responsibility, for the appreciation
of the matters which may have a bearing on the decision of
a licensing application. Public interest and the interests of
individuals which may be affected by the granting of an
application are, no doubt, the main considerations. It is not
always possible to draw a hard and fast line between what
falls under one of these heads and what under the other,
since the risk of injury to the public interest may depend
upon, or be evidenced by, the risk of injury to individual in-
terests. Within this extensive field of public and individual
interest, a wide discretion is entrusted to the Commission.
.. The granting or refusal of the application is made
by the legislation a matter of discretion—a discretion to be
exercised not arbitrarily or capriciously but upon a consider-
ation of the matters of public or individual interest which
are relevant in the particular case.'"
149 Id.
159 I3raithwaite v. Shoalhaven Shire Council, 44 Land & Val. Ct. 5, 8 (N.S.W. 1965).
121 Macquarie Alluvials No Liability v. Municipality Of Wellington, 20 Land & Val.
Ct. 25,.34-35 (N.S.W. 1941).
122 36 Land & Val. Ct. 62 (N.S.W. 1951-52).
153 Id. at 66, 68.
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Thus the burden is on the applicant to establish that the license ought
to be granted,'" or renewed.'"
6. Termination of Licenses and Permits.—Generally, licenses and
permits may be terminated by the state if the licensee or permittee
violates the conditions of the license or permit.'' The state agencies
may impose any conditions on licenses or permits that they see fit,'
although frequently the statutes require certain conditions.'" Typi-
cally, licenses and permits may be terminated if water is taken in a
quantity in excess of what is expressly authorized,'" if the water is
not being beneficially used,'" if it is being wasted, 1 "1
 if the diversion
work is not being beneficially used,' if the water is being used at an
unauthorized location,'" if excess land is irrigated,' if water is used
for an unauthorized purpose,'" or if the required charge is in
arrears.'"
7. Protection of Existing Uses.—The administering agencies of the
Australian states consider themselves at liberty to license new diver-
sions even if they will interfere with existing diversions,'" so that
older licenses generally have no priority over newer licenses. To date
very few licensees have been cut off to give way to new uses. Generally
354 Id. at 68-69, 74.
155 B.W. Rofe Partnership v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, L1964-651
N.S.W.R. 1848, 82 N.S.W. Weekly N. 577 (Land & Val. Ct. 1964).
156 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Viet.) (by implication); Control of
Waters Act 1919-1925, § 18(1)(a) (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1)(b)
(N.S.W.).
157 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, §§ 204, 206 (Viet.); Control of Waters Act
1919-1925, § 16 (So. Austl.) ; Water Act 1912-1966, § 12(1) (a) (N.S.W.).
152 See discussion of typical conditions imposed in licenses, pp. 666-67 supra.
155 Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1) (a) (N.S.W.); Victoria License to Divert ,
Water and Cut Race, conditions 3, 12(b) (Form W.D.L. 7).
16° Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1) (c) (N.S.W.); Victoria License to Divert Water
and Cut Race, condition 2 (Form W.D.L. 7).
161 Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1)(c) (N.S.W.); Control of Waters Act 1919-1925,
§ , 18(1)(b) (So. Austl.) ; Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race, condition 6
(Form W.D.L. 7).
162 Water Act 1912-1966, §§ 13F, 17A(1) (d) (N.S.W.).
163 Regulations under Control of Waters Acts 1919-1925, Sch. B, license, condition
3 (So. Austl. Gaz., Oct. 25, 1934); Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race,
condition 1 (Form W.D.L. 7).
164 Water Act 1912-1966, § 17A(1) (a) (N.S.W.) ; Regulations under Control of
Waters Acts 1919-1925, Sch. B, license, condition 2 (So. Austl. Gaz., Oct. 25, 1934);
Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race, condition 1 (Form W.D.L. 7).
165 Victoria License to Divert Water and Cut Race, condition 6 (Form W.D.L. 7).
166 Id. condition 12(a).
167 McCutchan & Hocking, Administrative and Legal Framework in Australia, 18
Aqua (Vitt.) 219 (1967) (Victorian practice) ; L. East, Victorian Water Law—Riparian
Rights 16 (c. 1949). In Victoria the Commission is not compelled to supply waters to
any person regardless of any other provisions in the Water Act or in any agreement. In
addition, it is not liable for any accidental failure of a water supply. Water Act 1958,
Act No. 6413, § 199(1) (Vitt.).
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the agencies have protected the supply of water to licensees, permitees,
and persons exercising the statutory riparian right (exempted divert-
ers). Where water has proven insufficient, the supply has been in-
creased by constructing storages. This is a process which cannot be
continued for much longer because rivers in the River Murray basin,
especially in Victoria, are almost completely regulated.'" In the future
a very real question will arise whether the agencies have any duty to
continue providing water to licensees, annual permittees, and exempted
diverters.
Regulations in Victoria and cases in New South Wales shed light
on this question. In Victoria, regulations controlling the exercise of
statutory riparian rights must be framed to protect the statutory ripar-
ian rights of unlicensed intermediate landholders.'" Moreover, when
planning state works, the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission
must determine to what extent the supply of water to property not
benefitted by the works would be injuriously affected and whether
further works should be constructed to provide a compensation water
supply?' While these provisions may not create a legal obligation on
the Commission to guarantee a supply of water to licensees, annual
permittees, and exempted diverters, they do create a policy framework
by which the Commission will attempt to provide such water.
In New South Wales, appeals from diversion license application
decisions are interpretive of the Water Conservation and Irrigation
Commission's obligation. It has been held that the Commission must
not grant licenses which will deprive lower "riparians" of their reason-
able share of available water for purposes exempt from licensing under
the Water Act; under the state's equitable distribution concept, such
a result would be prejudicial to the public interest."' The Commission
must balance the known advantage of benefit to the applicant against
the apprehended or possible disadvantage or prejudice to other ripar-
ians.112 These cases appear to create a duty in the Commission to pro-
tect the supply of water to licensees, annual permittees and exempted
diverters.
8. Restrictions in Time of Shortage.—Statutes of the Australian states
1 °8 Green, Measurement and Evaluation of the Water Resources of Victoria, 30
J. Instit. Eng'rs Austl. 43, 50 (1958) ; Haigh, Irrigation, Potential and Problems, in
Waters Resources Use and Management 21, 22, 29 (1964) (Proceedings of National
Symposium on Water Resources Use and Management, Australian Academy of Science,
Canberra, Sept. 9-13, 1963).
169 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 15 (Vict.).
17° Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 33, as amended by Water (Irrigation) Act
1959, Act No. 6582, § 5(2), and Water Act 1964, Act No. 7198, § 3 (a) (Vict.).
171 B.W. Rofe Partnership v. Water Conservation & Irrigation Comm'n, [1964-651
N.S.W.R. 1848, 82 N.S.W. Weekly N. 577, 588 (Land & Val. Ct. 1964) ; Water Act 4912-
1966, § 4A(1) (N.S.W.).
172 See cases cited note 144 supra.
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provide that during times of actual or threatened water shortage a
license may be revoked, suspended or modified." In Victoria, the
Commission may reduce the quantities of water delivered to all users
proportionately, or it may assign greater proportionate quantities to
land planted with fruit trees, vines and other plants which are more
difficult to restore to production than to lands sown with annual
plants.' Generally, in Victoria, annual permittees will be cut off be-
fore licensees." In South Australia reductions are proportionate."
A statutory classification system was adopted in New South Wales
in 1946 to affect the pattern of restrictions during shortages. Three
classes of licenses have been established (in order of superiority) :In
Class A—crops which have been irrigated for at least 5 years
and are improved pastures or a high-value plant (e.g., fruit
trees, vines, market vegetables, cereals);
Class B—crops which have been irrigated for at least 3 years
and land at least 75 percent of which contains improved
pastures or a high-value plant; and
Class C—all other licenses.
During shortages water is cut off to each class in inverse order of
superiority and reduced proportionately within each class. The con-
flicts between various uses during times of shortage have been con-
fined largely to agricultural uses. Very little industry is located in the
interior—mostly food processing plants and abattoirs. Consequently
the administering agencies have to worry very little about providing
industrial water supplies or about pollution of the rivers of the interior.
C. Comment on the Australian Experience
Australian law in practice calls upon the political and administra-
tive process to preserve the individual's right to a stable use of the
resource. Through its promotion of public works, it has mitigated the
disadvantage of climatic instability of supply. Efficiency of use has
been favored by administrative control of irrigation areas and private
diversions, by encouragement of intensive farming, high-value plants,
and large-scale close settlements and by the levy of fees for use. The
states have acquired ample authority (rarely exercised) to shift water
flexibly to new uses. Yet there is little apparent scope for private
initiative in innovating uses or trading rights, decisions on such mat-
111 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, * 197(1) (Vict.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919-
1925, * 18(1) (c) (So. Austl.); Water Act 1912-1966, * 18E (N.S.W.).
114 Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, * 197(1) (Viet.). See Venables, Private Irrigation
Schemes, 18 Aqua (Viet.) 192, 198 (1967).
111 Horsfall & Gillard, Goulburn Irrigation System in Northern Victoria and Asso-
ciated Works, 33 J. Instil. Eng'rs Austl. 285, 288 (1961).
176 Control of Waters Act 1919-1925, * 18(3) (b) (So. Austl.).
111 Water Act 1912-1966, 188 (NS.W.).
674
AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS
ters being made collectively and politically. In the future the Austral-
ian states may face harder problems as'industries, restricted by near
total apportionment of ready water in southeastern Australia and
relative congestion in the capital cities, seek to move inland to pre-
dominately agricultural areas
II. ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DOCTRINE
A. Scope of Analysis
Commentators have suggested five characteristics which should
be incorporated into any good system of water allocation 1 78
(1) The water right should be secure and definite in amount
to promote investment in water development.'"
(2) The water allocation system should promote locational
and applicational efficiencies of use to maximize de-
velopment.
(3) The water allocation system should be flexible to allow
for the introduction of new uses.
(4) Public rights and the public interest in water should be
protected by the system.
(5) Scope should be left for satisfaction of a variety of pri-
vate interests.'"
A reassessment in the light of these criteria of the alternative
doctrines for water allocation in the United States, existing and pro-
posed, is in order. While the literature discussing the various doctrines
is quite large, no one seems to have attempted to compare the strengths
and weaknesses of all of the doctrines. This section will examine four
major concepts, riparianism, prior appropriation, temporal nonprior-
178 See, e.g.,. Fisher, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in
Law of Water Allocation 75 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958) ; Trelease, A Model State
Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as Trelease, Model Code]; Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property
Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 Natural Resources J. 1 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as Trelease, Policies].
179 Trelease describes Ciriacy-Wantrup's three conceptual elements composing
security as:
(1) legal certainty, the protection against unlawful acts, subject to the "rule
uncertainty" and "fact uncertainty" inevitably involved in legal conflicts;
(2) physical certainty, the protection against variation in the quantity of water
available for the use; and
(3) tenure certainty, protection against loss of the water right by the exercise
of lawful acts of others.
Trelease, Model Code, supra note 178, at 307, discussing Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts
Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights, 32 J. Land Econ. 295 (1956).
180 "An ideal water law should give a water right those characteristics that will
encourage and enable people to make the best decisions as to water use in their own
interests and hence ultimately in the public interest." Trelease, Policies, supra note 178,
at 8.
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ity permit systems and marketplace concepts, with a view to selecting
one as being most suitable for allocating water in the eastern United
States. The Australian experience under a temporal nonpriority per-
mit system, described in the first section, will be drawn upon where
relevant.
B. Riparian Rights
1. Description.—The riparian system of water rights is in force in
most of the Eastern states: the 31 states extending eastwardly from
and including the tier of states along the west bank of the Mississippi
River. These states are usually classified as "humid" for water law
purposes; and the systems that prevail in them are considered to pre-
suppose an abundant supply. Riparianism provides that each pro-
prietor of land abutting on a watercourse has a coequal right to use
its water on his own riparian land to a reasonable extent. The reason-
ableness of the use is measured by its relation to uses made by others
on the same watercourse. With some exceptions, the water must be
used within the watershed of the watercourse. The right is an incident
inherent to the land abutting on a stream; no action by the landowner
or by a state administrative agency is necessary to perfect it.'" The
amount of water which may be taken by each proprietor is not fixed
in volume and may vary with time. If there is not enough water for
all demands, all uses are reduced until each is reasonable with respect
to others. Litigation may be necessary to accomplish this redistribu-
tion. The riparian right may be exercised at any time and is not lost by
nonuse. Riparian rules of allocation have been modified by special
legislation and by contractual arrangements between users.
2. The Problem of Security.—The riparian right may be criticized as
insecure, because any use sanctioned by it must be reasonable with
respect to other rightholders' uses, and those uses are constantly
changing and growing. 182 In any given situation, litigation may be
the only way to determine a riparian right. Apportionment decrees
stemming from such litigation may be rendered obsolete by changing
circumstances, including new or enlarged uses by nonparty users. As
a result, riparians in a water-shortage environment may tend to avoid
investing in works to utilize the water in surface streams,'" and to
prefer to develop alternative supplies, such as ground water.'"
181 A good, brief comparison of the basic differences betWeen riparianism and
prior appropriation is found in Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian
Doctrine States, 10 Buffalo L. Rev. 448, 449 (1961).
182 The only use of which a riparian can be sure is domestic use. He may take as
much water as he needs for domestic use regardless of the effect of such a diversion on
downstream riparians, even if he takes all the water in the stream. See 56 Am. Jur.
Waters 345 (1947). Of course, on most streams the amount of flow depletion from
domestic use diversions would be very small.
183 Certainly this was the experience in New South %Vales in the Riverina pastoral
676
AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS
Riparianism's prime advantage lies in its flexibility. It allows
new uses to be created with a minimum of difficulty and gives new
uses the same rights as the old. Technological and economic growth is
not inhibited by the existence of water rights serving uses developed
in an earlier age. But that growth can be inhibited by the fear that
water demands will outstrip supply in a situation where all users have
correlative and equal rights.
Riparian law seems to be based upon an unspoken premise
that if rights to use are restricted to those persons who have
access to the water through the ownership of the banks, and
if those persons restrict their demands on the water to rea-
sonable uses, there is enough for all.'"
Unfortunately, the method by which flexibility is achieved—the doc-
trine of reasonable sharing—is not workable when the water sur-
plus vanishes; all uses are then constricted, and the system's vaunted
flexibility exists only at the price of insecurity of the right and conse-
quent deterence to resource development.
The riparian right, being legally insecure under certain circum-
stances, can, however, be bolstered by various legal devices, of which
the chief are special legislation, contracts or grants among users, and
outright purchase of riparian rights or of lands to which such rights
are annexed.
Legislation has been enacted to augment the riparian rights of
special interests. Among the oldest examples are the milldam acts,
which, in effect, augment the rights annexed to existing mills by pro-
hibiting the construction of milldams which would affect the head of
or flow of water to the existing mills.'" The constancy of flow that
these acts guarantee is more secure than that afforded by the common
districts in the 1880's and 90's before the Water Rights Act 1896, 60 Vict. No. 20 (N.S.
W.), abolished riparian rights and established the diversion licensing system. See Lyne,
Third Report of Royal Commission—Conservation of Water, 5 N.S.W. Votes & Proc.
715, 724-25 (2d Sess. 1887).
181 In North Carolina and Wisconsin, irrigators have been turning away from
watercourses to ground water for sources of water. Part of the reason may be the riparian
land limitation imposed by the Wisconsin permit system or the vagaries of riparianism in
North Carolina. Evidence suggests, however, that in many cases a well in a field proves
to be physically more convenient to operate than a pump located at streamside. F. Oster-
houdt, An Economic Analysis of Wisconsin's Diversion Permit System for Agricultural
Irrigation 220-29 (Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Wis. Water Resources Center 1967); Heath,
Alternative Water Demands and the Adequacy of Present Arrangements, in Water
Resources and Economic Development in the South 53, 62 (Agricultural Policy Insti-
tute,.N.C. State Univ. 1965).
185 Trelease, Policies, supra note 178, at 7.
186 Acts may give mill owners power to flow (flood) lands. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 253, §§ 1-38. (1959), and may prohibit flowing of previously erected mills. Del.
Code Ann. tit. 23, § 1901 (1953); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 253, § 2 (1959); Va. Code
Ann. §§ 62-95, -101, -103 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 31.32 (1965).
677
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
law riparian right; the latter being merely a right that is reasonable
as compared to the rights of other users. The principle of the milldam
acts is so old that it has been incorporated into the common law in
some states.'87 Moreover, similar statutes have been passed to pro-
tect analogous interests. The log boom and dam acts"' aided the
lumber industry. Large-scale diversions to cranberry bogs' and for
taconite miningm have been protected. Power companies may apply
for the condemnation of riparian rights for power reservoirs and
power generation.1'1 All of these economic interests have acquired by
legislation water rights which are sufficient modifications of riparian-
ism to be secure for their purposes. In fact, most legal conflicts in-
volving water rights are adjudicated on the basis of this special
legislation rather than on the basis of the common law of riparian
rights."2
In areas of intense water use, demands can outstrip local supplies.
This has happened on a few industrial rivers in the East In such
situations, the users often will divide the available water among them-
selves by contract or grant.'" They may prorate the available flow
187 For cases giving priority to existing mills, see, e.g., Harp v. Iowa Falls Elec.
Co., 196 Iowa 317, 191 N.W. 520 (1923); Wentworth v. Poor, 38 Me. 243 (1854); Mowry
v. Sheldon, 2 R.I. 369 (1852). For cases giving a prescriptive right to mills after use
for a term of years, see, e.g., Buddington v. Bradley, 10 Conn. 213 (1834) ; Strickler v.
Todd, 10 S. & R. 63 (Pa. 1823) (later abandoned in favor of riparian rights, M'Calmont
v. Whitaker, 3 Rawle 84 (Pa. 1831)) ; Saunders v. Newman, 106 Eng. Rep. 95 (KB.
1818) ; 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *403.
188 There were 802 special legislative franchises in Wisconsin for dams, log booms,
and channel and flow improvements. J. Hurst, Law and Economic Growth 540-41 (1964).
The granting of the franchise was held to be a valid exercise of the paramont public
right over navigation in Cohn v. Wausau Boom Co., 47 Wis. 314, 2 NM. 546 (1879) ;
cf. Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 22.1511-.1573 (1937) (enabling acts and powers of river improve-
ment companies).
1" E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 253, §§ 39-40 (1956) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 94.26
(1965). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has avoided addressing itself to the constitu-
tionality of the Wisconsin cranberry statute. Cranberry Creek Drainage Dist. v. Elm
Lake Cranberry Co., 170 Wis. 362, 367, 174 NM. 554, 556 (1920).
190 Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 105.46, .64 (Supp. 1967) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 107.05 (Supp.
1968).
191 See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. ,§ 22.1688 (1937); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 31.15 (1965).
192 The Wisconsin Reports bear witness that common law doctrine alone gov-
erned only a minor proportion of the problems of stream-use regulation. Of 158
cases brought to the Wisconsin Supreme Court over forest-area uses of inland
streams of navigation or power [from 1841 to publication], only 23 (about 15
Per cent) turned on rights or duties defined simply by common law; in 85 per
cent of these lawsuits the parties' positions were established within a framework
of statute law. Though (as was characteristic of nineteenth-century legislation)
the statutes regulating stream use fell far short of constituting a comprehensive
code, they were nonetheless the principal body of public policy.
J. Hurst, supra note 188, at 540-41.
183 See, e.g., Batavia Mfg. Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 III. 230 (1878) ; Powers v
Perkins, 432- Mich. 33, 92 NM. 790 (1902) ; Fickler v. Fredricksburg Power Co.,. 133
Va. 571, 112 S.E. 775 (1922) ; Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 153 Wis. 69,
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or create an internal system of priorities."' Their little private water
allocation systems created by contract will remain viable as long as
the consumptive uses or flow patterns are not altered drastically. Al-
location by contract or grant appears to be a useful tool for localized
situations.
Outright purchase of riparian rights occurs when large-volume
users of water have located on relatively small streams where little
competition for water exists. These users may find it advisable to take
steps to prevent such competition from arising in the future. A supply
of water from upstream can be made more secure either by purchasing
the riparian rights of upstream riparians or by purchasing the front-
ages and cutting off riparian rights from the severed backlands. Both
techniques have been employed by the pulp and paper, and textile
industries in North Carolina."'
This potential insecurity of the riparian right does not -yet seem
to have hampered development of the resource to any great extent.
Most industrial users, for example, appear satisfied with their riparian
rights and little concerned to take steps to bolster them. In the East,
where most withdrawals are industrial and municipal,'" agricultural
and conservation interests seem to have been more active than indus-
trial interests in promoting permit-system statutes that would replace
the riparian right. 197 On the other hand, research in North Carolina
indicates that high water usage industries are concerned with the legal
insecurity of their water rights and take steps to firm them up."' Yet,
smaller users of industrial water in that state, and elsewhere, have
shown less concern about the security of their riparian rights."' There
may be several reasons for this. Their water demands may be small
140 N.W. 1066 (1913). See Note, Are Water Rights Marketable in Wisconsin ? 1966 Wis.
L. Rev. 942.
A striking number of the private power dam law suits grow out of consentual
relationships, turning on matters of contract or title affecting the ownership or
style of use of water-power sites and water-power rights, or labor performed
in developing such sites, The number of suits of this character symbolized the
extent to which men depended on contract and property arrangements to provide
frameworks of working relationships.
J. Hurst, supra note 188, at 155.
194 An internal priority system was established by the grantor of canal water rights
in Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 153 Wis. 69, 140 N.W. 1066 (1913).
1" Walker, Industrial Water Use in North Carolina 23, 30 (Univ. of N.C. Instit.
of Gov't, U.N.C. Water Resources Paper No. 13, Sept. 1964) ; see also Johnson v. Armour
& Co., 69 N.D. 769, 291 N.W. 113 (1940) ; Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 75 N.W. 945
(1898): cf. Annot., 127 A.L.R. 835 (1940).
106 U.S. Geological Survey, Circ. No. 456, Estimated Use of Water in the U.S. 1960
at 13-26 (1961).
197 Cf. Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System—
Part One, 7 Natural Resources J. 499, 505 n.15 (1967).
198 Walker, supra note 195, at 30, 44.
109 Id. at 21, 44-45.
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compared to the unused dependable water supply. Alternative water
supplies may be available which are cheaper than purchase of riparian
rights would be. The economic climate of the area may not be con-
ducive to any general industrial development, so that purchase of
riparian rights may appear to constitute superfluous insurance.'" In
short, though research has not determined whether the uncertainties of
riparianism have hindered development of capital-intensive projects, 201
the system has not substantially hampered industrial development along
eastern rivers.
3. Locational Efficiency.
a. Place-of-Use Restrictions. Another major criticism of riparian-
ism is that it tends to foster locational inefficiencies. There are two
basic place-of-use restrictions in most systems of riparianism: (1)
water must be used only on property contiguous to the watercourse,
and (2) water may not be used outside the watershed of the stream
from which it is taken. Together, these restrictions operate to define
the extent of riparian land. These restrictions create inefficiencies of
use when the best opportunities for use exist on nonriparian land or
outside the watershed. The extensive use of water for irrigation on
nonriparian land in the West is one use which, for example, would be
prevented by riparian law.'
Two major doctrines have emerged defining just which land that
abuts a stream is to be considered riparian land. The "source of title"
test201
 states that water may be used only on land which has been
200 Id. at 44-45.
201 See Fisher, supra note 178, at 80-81 n.13; O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute—
The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 549, 577-
78 (1962). Consider, however, the special legislation giving certain public utilities the
power to condemn riparian rights and to operate storage reservoirs. See statutes cited
note 191 supra.
202 It has been argued that locations for efficient use of water can always be found
on riparian land. J. Cribbet, Illinois Water Rights Law and What Should Re Done About
It 28 (III. St. Chamber of Comm. 1958). Contra, Ziegler, Water Use Under Common
Law Doctrines, in Water Resources and the Law 49, 70-73 (Univ. of Mich. Law School
1958). See F. Osterhoudt, supra note 184, at 287-322.
2°3 See 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 277 (1947). Severe "source of title" restrictions in
many western states may be the result of a conscious or unconscious policy of the west-
ern courts to cut off unexercised riparian rights as much as possible to make more water
available to appropriators. Such a rule coupled with a very short period to mature pre-
scriptive rights could cause a very rapid reduction in the demands for water under
riparian rights. See T. Lauer, Riparian Rights as Property, in Water Resources and the
Law 131, 167-69 (Univ. of Mich. Law School 1958). This policy would not be a useful
tool in the East if riparianism is retained as the only water allocation system. For this
reason, the western "source of title" cases should be looked at dubiously as precedent for
adopting "source of title" in the East.
The only eastern states to define riparian land have followed "unity of title." See
cases cited note 205 infra. The courts in England and the commonwealth countries have
not defined riparian land at all.
Although the definition of the extent of riparian land is not at all dear in the eastern
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held as a single tract throughout its chain of tide. This means that any
nonabutting portions of the original tract which have been severed
forever lose their riparian character unless a contrary intention is mani-
fested. Reuniting such severed tracts with the abutting tract will not
reestablish their riparian status 2 04 The total amount of riparian
land under this rule cannot be enlarged by the purchase of contiguous
back tracts.
Another rule followed in some states, the "unity of title" rule,
provides that any tracts contiguous to the abutting tract are riparian
if all of them are held under single ownership regardless of the times
when the various tracts were acquired. This means that a riparian
proprietor may enlarge the amount of his riparian land by purchasing
contiguous back tracts within the watershed?" The general rule that
water may not be diverted to lands outside the watershed of the
orginating stream'N10 follows from the rule that water diverted for any
extraordinary purpose must be returned to the stream above the next
lower riparian's land?'
The difference in the amount of land available for riparian water
use under these two rules can be considerable. A recent study in
northwestern Wisconsin indicates that the "unity of title" test would
encompass 64 percent more land that the "source of title" test?" This
substantial increase results from the fact that most farms today have
different boundaries than the original farms and that many back tracts
have changed hands.
Although riparianism generally restricts use of water to riparian
states, administrators of diversion permit systems in some of these states have relied on
the commentators and have established "source of title" restrictions. See Comment,
Wisconsin's Water Diversion Law: A Study of Administrative Case Law, 1959 Wis.
L. Rev. 279, 293.
201 See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 424-25, 10 P. 674, 773-74 (1886) ; Boehmer
v. Big Rock Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 27, 48 P. 908, 910-11 (1897); Watkins Land
Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 585, 86 S.W. 733, 735 (1905); Yearsley v. Cater, 149
Wash. 285, 287-89, 270 P. 804, 805 (1928).
2°8 See, e.g., Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 39, 64 P. 855, 858, (1901); Slack v. Marsh,
11 Phila. 543, 545 (Pa. C.P. 1875).
2% See, e.g., Harrell v. City of Conway, 271 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Ark. 1954); Ana-
heim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 330, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907) ; Stratton v.
Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 86-89, 103 N.E. 87, 88-90 (1913) ; McCarter
v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 708, 65 A. 489, 494-95 (1906), aff'd,
209 U.S. 349 (1908) ; Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S.D. 592, 594-95, 245 N.W. 390,
391 (1932) ; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 585, 86 S.W. 733, 735 (1905) ;
Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 551-562, 106 S.E. 508, 511-515 (1921) ;
Miller v. Baker, 68 Wash. 19, 20, 23, 122 P. 604-05 (1912).
There is weak authority in England that the watershed limitation is not recog-
nized. See Norbury (Lord) v. Kitchin, 176 Eng. Rep. 132 (N.P. 1862).
202 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 344 (1947).
208 F. Osterhoudt, supra note 184, at 266-73. The Wisconsin court has not decided
which rule will be followed. The Public Service Commission is of the opinion that the
"source of title" test controls. See note 203 supra.
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land, there is considerable authority for the proposition that in many
instances water may be used by riparians on nonriparian land. These
cases, admittedly the minority rule, state that water may be diverted
to and used on nonriparian land provided that lower riparians are
not damaged.2" Two states in this group allow use on noririparian
land even though riparians are damaged if the use is reasonable.21)
To the contrary is the majority rule that riparian rights may not be
exercised on nonriparian land."' Many eastern states have not decided
which rule to follow.
Place-of-use restrictions have not yet raised any obvious problems
in the East, where development of industry has been concentrated at
streamside. The problem of locational restrictions probably will be
more relevant for the East if irrigation becomes prevalent, or if severe
water shortages should occur.
b. Use of Water by Nonriparians. One advantage propounded
for prior appropriation is that nonriparians can gain access to surface
watercourses. Contrarily, it is suggested that nonriparians may only
with difficulty do so under riparianism."2 This is not a universal rule.
Riparian rights may be severed from the lands to which they are
attached and conveyed separately.213 Severance may be accomplished
by several methods. Riparian rights may be conveyed by grant, or
reserved in the grantor in a grant to another of the land to which they
209 See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 86-89, 103 N.E. 87,
88-90 (1913); Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891) ; Smith v. Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 501-02, 172 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1946) ; Texas Co. v. Burkett,
117 Tex. 16, 25, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (1927) ; Lawrie v. SiLsby, 82 Vt. 505, 512, 74 A.
94, 96 (1909).
While the English cases seem to prohibit nonriparian use altogether, Attwood V.
Llay Main Collieries, Ltd., 119267 1 Ch. 444, 458, relief will be granted only if there is
sensible diminution of flow or material damage. See Norbury (Lord) v. Kitchin, 176
Eng. Rep. 132 (NP. 1862).
210 Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891); Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 74 A.
94 (1909).
211 See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 330, 88 P. 978, 980
(1907) ; Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277, 304 (1884) ; Hendrix v. Roberts Marble
Co., 174 Ga. 389, 394, 165 SE. 223, 226 (1932); Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont.
152, 159, 201 1'. 702, 703 (1921) ; Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 353, 93
NW. 781, 790 (1903); McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 708-10,
65 A. 489, 494-95 (1905), aff'd, 209 U.S. 349 '(1908); Scranton Gas & Water Co. v.
Delaware. L. & W.R.R., 240 Pa. 604, 610, 88 A. 24, 25 (1913) ; Town of Gordonsville v.
Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 558-60, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92,
97, 77 BE. 535, 537 (1913).
212 Trelease suggests that obtaining a right to use water on nonriparian land may
be very difficult, although not entirely proscribed. Trelease, Model Code, supra note
178, at 303-04.
213 Winchell v. Clark, 68 Mich. 64, 73, 35 NW. 907, 913 (1888) ; Texas Co. v.
Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 25, 296 SW. 273, 276 (1927); Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va.
218, 224, 8 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1940).
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were attached."' They may be leased"' or licensed."' The right of
the grantee is derivative; his right is measured by the right the grantor
had."'
The question of particular concern here is whether a nonriparian
may enforce his acquired rights against third party nonconsenting
riparians as if he were a riparian. Several courts refuse to enforce the
rights of nonriparians against nonconsenting riparians, 218 although
there are a few courts which do."' A nonriparian may acquire riparian
rights against third party riparians by grant,' lease, 221 prescrip-
tion,--- condemnation 223 and special legislation.' Admittedly the
rights of nonriparians to acquire riparian rights in these cases must
be placed against the cases holding that even riparians may not use
water on nonriparian land.
Certainly the ability of nonriparians to gain access to water by
grant from or contract with a riparian broadens the scope of useful-
ness of water. At the same time, however, to the extent courts will en-
force these rights acquired by nonriparians against other riparians,
to that degree will the certainty of the latters' water rights be lessened.
c. Methods to Bypass Locational Restrictions. Rights to water
may be acquired under the common law of prescription. By this doc-
214 Miller & Lux Inc. v. J.G. James Co., 179 Cal. 689, 178 P. 716 (1919) ; Batavia
Mfg. Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 Ill. 230, 239 (1878); Mandeville v. Comstock, 9
Mich. 536 (1862) ; Lawrie v. Silsby 82 Vt. 505, 511, 74 A. 94, 96 (1909) ; Hite v. Town
of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 224-25, 8 S.E.2d 369, 371-72 (4940).
215 See Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 501, 172 P.2d 1002, 1005
(1946) ; Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 25, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (1927); Bergeron
v. Forger, 125 Vt. 207, 210, 214 A.2d 85, 88 (1965).
210 See Goodrich v. Burbank, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 459 (1855) ; Rerick v. Kern, 14
S. & R. 267 (Pa. 1826).
217 See Spring Valley Water Co. v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 157, 164, 263
P. 318, 321 (1927) ; Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 506, 172 P.2d
1002, 1005 (1946) ; Lawrie v.'Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 511, 74 A. 94, 96 . (1909).
218 See Heilbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. 426, 432, 17 P. 535, 538 (1888) ;
Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 159 Eng. Rep. 545 (Ex. 1864).
210 See, e.g., Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891); Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt.
505, 512, 74 A. 94, 96 (1909).
220 Spring Valley Water Co. v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 157, 263 P. 318
(1927) ; Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891) ; Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240,
56 A. 1106 (1904). The appurtenant water right may be conveyed by grant simultan-
eously with the severed back tract and enforced against nonconsenting riparians. Miller
& Lux Inc. v. J.G. James Co., 179 Cal. 689, 178 P. 716 (1919) ; Frazee v. Railroad
Comm'n, 185 Cal. 690, 201 P. 921 (1921) (partition); St. Anthony Falls Water Power
Co. v. Minneapolis, 41 Minn. 270, 43 N.W. 56 (1889).
221 Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946).
222 See Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. II (1922) ; Kennedy v. Niles Water
Supply Co., 173 Mich. 474, 139 N.W. 241 (1913) ; Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash.
398, 153 P. 342 (1915); Holker v. Poritt, L.R. 10 Ex. 59 (1875).
228 Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 775, 76 S.E. 921, (1913).
224 See, e.g., Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts & Berks Canal Co., 33 'L.T.R. (ns.)
513 (H.L. 1875).
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trine either a riparian or a nonriparian may obtain a right to use water
on nonriparian land which is otherwise prohibited. A prescriptive right
may be acquired only when the use which generates it is "adverse" to
the rights of downstream riparians:' i.e., the use must be open,
notorious, hostile and under claim of right. Adversity has come to have
two distinct meanings which are adhered to in different states. One
meaning defines adversity as the bare invasion of a legal right. 226 The
other meaning requires that the invasion of right cause injury suffi-
cient to justify an award of damages. Hence, adversity will not exist in
the absence of material damage or sensible diminution as a measure
of presumed damage."' Under such a rule it may be very difficult to
acquire a prescriptive right to a nonriparian use.
Under a rule followed in a few states," the need to acquire a
prescriptive right for a nonriparian use does not exist unless the use
or amount of water taken is unreasonable. Such a use may be adjudged
reasonable, however, even if it causes some damage or diminution.
Whether courts would apply the same test of reasonableness to ripari-
an and nonriparian uses alike cannot be predicted.
Municipalities have power to acquire water rights by eminent
domain.' Municipal water utilities thus have power to condemn the
rights of nonmunicipal riparians and to divert water to all lands with-
in the municipalities, including nonriparian land. They may sell water
to nonriparians for all uses. Industries may purchase water from a
municipal water utility to avoid the locational restrictions of riparian-
ism. 23° These industrial users purchased municipal water equalling
about five percent of the total water withdrawn for industrial purposes
in the East in 1960. 2" The types of industries which purchase water
from municipal water supplies are not indicated in the statistics. Pre-
225 See Hargrave v. Cook, 108 Cal. 72, 79, 41 P. 18, 20 (1895) ; Clark v. Allaman,
71 Kan. 206, 245-46, 80 P. 571, 585 (1905) ; Kennedy v. Niles Water Supply Co., 173
Mich. 474, 475, 139 N.W. 241 (1913) ; Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 245, 56 A. 1106
(1904) ; Coalter v. Hunter, 25 Va. 58, 65 (1826) ; Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276,
280-82, 108 P. 608, 609-10 (1910).
226 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584, 592 (1818) ; Bolivar Mfg. Co. v.
Neponsett Mfg. Co., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 241, 247 (1834).
227 Kennedy v. Niles Water Supply Co., 173 Mich. 474, 475, 139 N.W. 241 (1913).
See recent legislation requiring actual damage before suit can be brought for interference
with the natural condition of the watercourse. N.Y. Conserv. Law § 429j (McKinney
1967).
228 See cases cited note 209 supra.
229 See note 237 infra for cases holding that municipalities may not divert water to
nonriparian land without purchasing water rights, and cases to the contrary holding that
municipal diversions to all lands within a municipality are a reasonable exercise of its
riparian right.
230 Industries use a large portion of all water withdrawn by public agencies in the
East: 37% in 1960. See U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 196, at 14.
237 See id. at 14, 20.
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sumably they are the smaller volume users for whom self-supply will
not achieve significant savings.
Ground water is readily available in many parts of the East, and
will be the cheapest source of supply for many nonriparian users.
Ground water constitutes about four percent of total water withdrawn
for industrial purposes in the East in 1960. 2'
Both municipal water supplies and ground water constitute
practical alternatives to surface water as sources of supply, and may
be utilized to avoid locational restrictions limiting diversions of water
for streams under riparianism. Each has restrictions of its own
which limit their usefulness. Some states restrict the use of ground
water to the tract from which the water is withdrawn 2 33 Municipal
water may not be available outside the limits of the municipality.
d. Comment on Locational Restrictions. Two rules discussed
above—that which would permit riparians to make nonriparian uses,
and the "unity of title" doctrine—manifest a liberal rather than a
universal way of looking at the riparian right. Opinion that would
allow nonriparians to acquire riparian rights is less frequently encount-
ered,' since such a use is even further than the two examples above
from the elements of the traditional riparian right. All such uses are
predicated on the court's conception of the reasonableness of the use
applied for. As the relationship between the prospective user and the
source of supply becomes more remote, courts tend to resist allowance
of use. Decision on such matters may, accordingly, be merely a function
of "reasonableness" as an abstract concept.
Two problems are evident here: enlargement of riparian land and
consequent increases in water use; and use of water on nonriparian
land. The concerns of the courts probably are similar in both situa-
tions. In "unity of title" states, riparian land may be increased by
"tacking," that is, by purchasing nonriparian land contiguous to
riparian land. A nonriparian may become a riparian by purchasing a
contiguous riparian tract. There is no theoretical limit to such a
232 See id.
223 The "reasonable use" or "correlative rights" doctrine restricts use of ground
water to overlying land. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306
S.W.2d 111 (1957) ; Koch. v. Wick, 87 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1956) ; Schenk v. City of Ann
Arbor, 196 Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917) ; Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623,
74 A. 379 (1909) ; Rouse v. City of Kinston, 188 N.C. I, 16, 123 S.E. 482, 489 (1924) ;
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 132-34, 14 A.2d 87, 90-91 (1940);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1936).
The contrary "absolute ownership" rule allows diversion from a well to nonoverlying
land. See, e.g., Hartford Rayon Corp. v. Cromwell Water Co., 126 Conn. 194, 197-98,
10 A.2d 587, 588 (1940) ; Hougan v. Milwaukee & St. P.R.R., 35 Iowa 558 (1872) ;
Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 76, 108 S.E. 671, 673 (1921); Menne v. City of Fond
In Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1956).
234 See cases cited note 219 supra.
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process; in practice it is limited only by the amount of land available
for purchase This tacking process may be carried out no matter how
small the original riparian tract may be, since the measure of the
right to divert water is not the length of the riparian shoreline or the
size of the original riparian tract. Few American decisions have dis-
cussed the question whether there is or ought to be a limit to tacking
under the "unity of title" doctrine."'
Perhaps this problem is more hypothetical than real. The rule
of "reasonable use" would still apply to protect lower riparians from
excessive diversions. Water remaining after use must still be returned
to the stream before it leaves the property of the diverter. These rules
ought to give as much protection under "unity of title" as they do
under "source of title." If they do not, there may be help in a British
case which ruled that a railroad may not divert water along its 20-foot
right-of-way from a small stream to a water tank at its station one-half
mile away, even though the station site is riparian so far as land title
is concerned. The tank was reasoned to be too far away from the
stream to be riparian for diversion purposes, and the water was to be
used in locomotives up to 40 miles away?" This "riparian for diver-
sion purposes" principle might be applied to "tacking" to prevent too
distant lands from becoming riparian. The problem of use of water by
riparians on noncontiguous land may be elaborated along similar lines.
The use would be permitted according to a standard of "reasonable-
ness."
Enlargement of water use by transfer to nonriparians presents
another problem. A nonriparian's right to use water is derivative of his
grantor riparian's right to use the water. Accordingly, the nonriparian's
use is reasonable if the riparian's would be. But reasonableness is based
on the use's intrinsic and comparative values to the riparian, the
relationship of his demand to the demands of other riparians, the
nature of the stream, and matters of public policy. If it should be
held that tract size is not an element of "reasonableness," then a
nonriparian will be allowed to use water that the grantor riparian
physically could not have used. For example, a riparian may sell
water to a nonriparian papermill even if the riparian's land may be
too small to contain a papermill. If diverting water to a papermill
is otherwise reasonable, the nonriparian has then obtained a right to
divert more water than the grantor riparian was capable of using.
This result is undesirable, and the riparian's and nonriparian's tract
sizes should be considered an element of "reasonableness" in this
situation.
235 This assumes that the watershed limitation does not apply. But see Wasserburger
V. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 157-58, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744-45 (1966).
230 McCartney v. Londonderry & L.S. Ry., [1904] AC. 501 (Ir.).
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In the instances of use of water by nonriparians and "tacking,"
the amount of land where water can be used is enlarged. Yet use
by nonriparians is a distinct problem in that an indefinable and
indefinitely expandable class of landowners may acquire through it
rights to water which would not be available otherwise?" Therefore,
the courts have, for the most part, restricted uses to riparians to
prevent the indefinitely expandable class of potential nonriparian users
from gaining access to the streams.
The best rule in riparian states is probably (a) adoption of the
"unity of title" test, as more flexible than "source of title," (b) allow-
ing riparians to use water on nonriparian land according to a standard
of reasonableness, and (c) allowing nonriparians to purchase water
for use to the same extent that the grantor riparian physically could
have used water for the same purpose on his own land. 238
4. Protection of the Public Interest.—The common law recognizes
certain water use rights of the public that are paramount to riparian
rights." For example, as successors to the Crown, the states have
authority to protect rivers and streams for navigation.' This public
right is superior to any private rights to water in streams to which
these public rights attach.
The riparian doctrine seems well adapted to the recognition,
regulation and development of public uses of the water of navigable
streams. Public uses are recognized by the grafting on to riparian
rights of a paramount servitude or easement over a navigable stream
in favor of the public and its trustee, the state 241 Since the state
servitude is paramount, no compensation is paid for private water use
237 Probably for this reason alone most courts have not permitted municipalities to
divert water to their nonriparian residents without purchasing water rights from riparians
who would be affected by their diversions. E.g., Wallace v. City of Winfield, 96 Kan. 35,
38-39, 149 P. 693, 694-95 (1915); Sparks•Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 60 N.J. Eq. 399,
45 A. 596 (1900); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899);
Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941). Contra, City of Canton
v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902); Barre Water Co. v. Carnes, 65 Vt. 626,
27 A. 609 (1893).
238 In New York a statutory revision has been recommended to allow a riparian to
use water on his nonriparian land in lieu of use on his riparian land if lower riparians
would be damaged no more than if the water had been used on the diverter's riparian
land. Temporary State Comm'n on Water Resources Planning, State of New York,
Progress Report: Formula for Water Resources Management in New York State 219
(Legis. Doc. 45, 1967).
239 This section is not concerned with the question of bed ownership by the state.
270 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
277 The federal navigation servitude is also paramount to private rights on navigable
waters of the United States. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799,
808 (1950). It empOwers the federal government to protect, regulate, and make improve-
ments for navigation. The power to promote certain ancillary functions has been grafted
on to this primary function, Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations § 101.2 (A), in
2 Waters and Water Rights (R. Clark ed. 1967). No compensation need be paid for
private rights which are injured or destroyed by such federal activities. Cf. id. § 101.2 (B).
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rights injured or destroyed by the exercise of the servitude. This right
of the state to regulate navigable streams for the benefit of the public
has been termed a public trust. 242 Enhancement of public rights to
water is, of course, made at the cost of reducing the certainty of
private rights.
C. Prior Appropriation
1. Description.—For creating a secure and well defined water right,
one that is attractive to water users, the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion has been extolled. Prior appropriation was born and developed
in the arid western United States in response to a need for certainty
in obtaining water for mining and irrigation purposes. The doctrine
provides that in time of shortage individual appropriations are cut off
entirely, the earliest appropriation being the last to be cut off. Con-
versely, in times of abundance individual appropriations are restored
to use in toto, the senior appropriation first. The operation is com-
monly expressed by the maxim "first in time, first in right." An
appropriation is made for a definite volume per time unit for a stated
use at a particular place. The place of use may be on nonriparian
land. Although the date of priority is generally established by the
date of public notice or by the date of application for a permit, the
appropriation is effectively secured merely by applying the water to
the stated use. The use must be a beneficial one, made within a
reasonable time as a result of a diligent effort. The right continues as
long as the water continues to be applied to the beneficial use. It is
lost by abandonment or by statutory forfeiture after a period of
nonuse. In some states the ownership of the right, nature of use, place
of use, or place of diversion may be transferred or sold without loss
of priority.243
The prior appropriation right today is evidenced by a document;
usually referred to as a permit 2 44 It is usually issued by a state
242 The public trust is used to regulate obstructions to navigation, Hixon v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966), the construction of dams,
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952),
the operation of dams, Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d
167, 8 N.W.2d 350 (1958), their preservation after their economic use has terminated,
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 105.42, 110.31 (1964), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:4-9 (1966), Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 31.185 (1965), scenic values, Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra, Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S.
428 (1967), general economic activity, Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 A.
806 (1901), State v. Sunapee Dam Co., 70 N.H. 458, 50 A. 108 (1900), St. Regis Paper
Co. v. Water Resources Bd., 92 N.H. 164, 26 A.2d 832 (1942), Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot,
109 Wis. 418, 84 N.W. 855, 85 N.W. 402 (1901), or recreational opportunities, State v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1956).
243 See note 181 supra.
244 Actually a permit is issued to enable an applicant to begin constructing his
diversion works. A water right license is issued when water is actually applied to benc-
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administrative agency, after an application or adjudication procedure
which varies from state to state." The state administering agency
often is given power to deny applications for permits or modifications
of permits to protect senior appropriators or the public interest."
For allocating water during times of shortages, or for choosing between
simultaneous applications for permits, several states have enacted
statutes giving certain uses preferred status." Some states also give
these preferred users condemnation power." Prior appropriation is
complicated in some western states, notably California, by the co-
existence of riparian rights which govern the allocation of a significant
portion of their waters.
2. Advantages Propounded.—Proponents of prior appropriation argue
that it offers advantages over riparianism.' Its most attractive char-
acteristic is security of right. An appropriation permit creates a per-
petual right to use a defined volume of water from a particular source
to be used on designated land subject to identified senior rights of the
same nature. The permittee knows exactly what his water right is.
The very defined nature of the right makes it transferable and subject
to sale. While the structure of rights may appear to be very rigid and
inflexible, persons wishing to introduce new uses in situations where
all available water has been appropriated may purchase the rights
they need. Rights to use are not subject to the hazard of unused senior
rights being exercised at a later time, because rights are lost by nonuse.
3. Security of the Prior Appropriation Right.—The primary attribute
of appropriation is security of right. Of course, the rights of senior
appropriators on highly variable rivers are much more secure than
those of junior appropriators. But the latter can be sure that any
investment by them to improve regulation of flow by construction of
storage reservoirs or augmentation of supply by transbasin diversion
canals will be protected. Such increased flows, though subject to
temporary stoppage in times of scarcity, will not be subject to use
by others, as may happen under riparianism." This type of security
ficial use. Because the document evidencing the water right is so often referred to as a
permit, that terminology has been used in this article.
245 In Wyoming, the State Engineer, appointed by authority of Wyo. Const. art. 8,
§ 5, has authority to approve or reject applications, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-203 (1957),
which must be made by all who wish to use the state's water. Id. § 41-201. Similar appli-
cation must be made in Arizona by any person "intending to acquire the right to the
beneficial use of water." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45 - 142 (1956). Application is made to
the state land department. Id. § 45-301.2.
246 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-203 (1957) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-143A (1956) .
247 See statutes cited note 277 infra.
248 See statutes cited note 276 infra.
249 See generally Trelease, Model Code, supra note 178.
250 See id. at 308-09.
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should create an atmosphere encouraging to capital-intensive water
resource development.
The security achieved under prior appropriation systems in the
West has been eroded by two problems: overappropriation, with
concomitant unused rights, and residual riparian rights. The first
can be avoided in a new system if politics will allow the agency to
avoid it. The second raises serious constitutional questions, especially
in the East with its heavily utilized streams spawning complex riparian
rights relationships.
It often happens that more water has been claimed for appropri-
ation than exists in the stream.251 Junior appropriators, in this case,
will often find themselves using water claimed, but not used, by senior
appropriators. The junior appropriators are generally permitted to
make this use when the seniors have no need of the appropriated
water.' But when a senior appropriator desires to use water under
a claim of right that has not lapsed, the junior's right is by definition
foreclosed.' This situation developed before the days of administra-
tive control of appropriation claims through issuance of permits. It
should be easier for an agency administering a new eastern appro-
priation system to avoid overappropriation by appropriators because
acquisition of "paper rights" can be prevented.
A serious problem in some western states, and one bound to be
troublesome in the East, is residual riparian rights.' If a riparian
right is deemed vested (either on the theory that the right was being
exercised at the time prior appropriation was adopted, or on the
theory that the lands to which they were appurtenant had been con-
veyed to private owners before the ability to acquire riparian rights
had been cut off), it will, of course, be treated as a property right,
one that may not be taken without compensation. It will then have
priority over all appropriative rights. This has been a problem where
the one system has succeeded the other.2"
Yet, agricultural irrigation has developed in most of the East only
since the 1950's. Hence, outside heavily developed industrial and
251 This is a very serious problem in some areas in the West settled early. See Fisher,
Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in Law of Water Allocation 75,
95-98 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958). Some of the early claims for appropriation were
ridiculous. See, e.g. Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922).
252 36 Am. Jur. Waters § 303 (1947).
253 One of the purposes of stream adjudications by state agencies is to eliminate
such unused appropriations by forfeiture so as to make appropriations put to beneficial
IBC more SCUM.
254 See W. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water in the West 30-34
(1942).
255 W. Champion, Transition From Riparian Doctrine, in Proceedings of the Water
Resources Law Colloquium 46, 54 (Instit. Research Land & Water Resources, Pa. St.
Univ. 1967) ; Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi—A Statutory Analysis, 39
Miss. L.J. 1,16 (1967).
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metropolitan areas, the problem of residual riparian rights may not
yet have reached serious proportions since not many riparian rights
will have vested there. But if many rights are vested before prior
appropriation is adopted, there will be too little unallocated water to
make the appropriative system worthwhile. The old system may then
still be needed to settle disputes between and allocate water to users
in the vast majority of cases. Where water is already being substan-
tially or fully utilized, as in many industrial areas of the East,
substitution of prior appropriation for the older system may be
pointless.
Prior appropriation probably makes no sense even if all riparian
rights were abolished and the administrators started afresh. One of
two policies could be followed to establish temporal priorities. One is
recognition of priorities on the basis of historical use—a hopeless task,
since some claims would go back three and one-half centuries. The
other policy would be to allow all users to make new claims and to
grant temporal priorities on the basis of time of application. Besides
creating a new Oklahoma land rush, such a procedure would be unjust
because the priority of a claim and, therefore, its security would be
based on the accident of how fast the user or his attorney could run
to the registration office. The chief reason why prior appropriation is
not suited to most eastern situations is that the doctrine is designed
to promote rapid development of a largely unused resource. 2' This
development has already occurred in the East.
4. Efficiency of Water Use.—Prior appropriation has two features
which promote efficiency of use of water. One is the absence of a
place-of-use limitation. Since water may be used anywhere, diverters
will be more likely to use it wherever on their own lands it can be
used best. The other is the rule of reasonable beneficial use. Appro-
priators may obtain rights only to water which they actually put to
use." This use must be one which is beneficial, that is, some form of
use which has economic advantage. Water rights which are not exer-
cised beneficially will be lost by nonuse under abandonment or for-
feiture concepts.'
In the administration of western prior appropriation statutes
certain problems related to efficiency of use have arisen and must be
guarded against if the system is instituted in the East. Downstream
sites tended to be developed first because they were easier to develop.
Unfortunately water sent down a stream to those sites to satisfy senior
258 Cf. Trelease, Policies, supra note 178, at 7.
257 For an extensive discussion of beneficial uses, see W. Hutchins, supra note
254, at 314-16.
258 Abandonment and forfeiture are distinguished in In re Waters of Manse Spring,
60 Nev. 280, 287-88, 108 P.2d 311, 315 (1940).
691
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
rights may be subject to serious transmission losses 269—a result of
high evaporation rates and stream beds composed of porous soils?"
To reduce the extent of this problem the system should allow for
changes in location of use. To cope with the more extreme situations,
the administering agency should perhaps be given power to apply
incentive or coercive measures to cause such shifts in location.
Overappropriation can be an even more serious problem. Water
which is appropriated beyond the needs of the users, then drawn and
applied merely to avoid forfeiture, is water wasted. Use of such water
can seriously limit the overall degree of efficiency of use of water. In
the West this situation was especially serious in the early days of
appropriation, and has plagued the prior appropriation systems there
ever since."' It has been suggested that new appropriators even today
are rather generous in their estimates of the amounts of water they
need. 202 Eastern systems which may be established should incorporate
sufficient supervision over appropriations to avoid overappropriation.
5. Flexibility of Prior Appropriation to Accommodate New Uses.
a. Locational Rigidities. Prior appropriation grew of age in a
pioneering economy. This means the original appropriations, which
were acquired in perpetuity, are the most secure. They may or may
not be flexible enough for adaptation to the modern economy or
needs for water. Fisher describes the rigidity which may encrust the
system.
An appropriation right allows water to be applied to the
same purpose forever, but temporary or permanent changes
in the conditions of water use and supply in a region may
mean that the purposes for which water was originally
appropriated are not among the more important purposes
for which water is needed at a later time. Unfortunately,
the need for applying water to changed purposes may well
emerge after full over-all use has been achieved. The inter-
dependencies among users already established are likely to
250 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochrane, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 234 (1940)
(senior downstream use held to be reasonable even though a 77% channel transmission
loss was sustained).
2°0 Williams has commented:
Because losses by evaporation and percolation are great in arid regions, it is in
the interests of economy that the water should be diverted for irrigation as far
upstream as it can be properly used for that purpose; yet, an appropriator may
be legally bound not to divert the water if his senior, perhaps many miles down-
stream, is unable to obtain his full amount, to the last drop.
Williams, Irrigation Law in Colorado (pts. 1 & 2), 10 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 87, 178, 190
(1937) (footnotes omitted).
2° 1 See notes 252-53 supra and note 274 infra.
262 See Williams, supra note 260.
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block changes to different purposes if existing conditions of
supply are to be strictly preserved for the benefit of the
established users 263
A small portion of a river will, of course, be affected more by a
diversion of a given size than a large portion of the same river. The
physical setting of a river thus fixes the interrelationships between
diversions at various points and the flows remaining below these points.
On a fully utilized river, rights of others could be affected adversely
by even relatively small changes in volume or location of diversion
by one diverter upstream. As interrelationships between rights on a
river grow more complex, the room for adjustment becomes less
because too many senior rights would be involved 264
Under prior appropriation in some western states, any change of
the location of diversion or place of use may require making a new
appropriation:205 Such a rule creates rigidity because no appropriator
is likely to give up his senior right to effect changes in location of
diversion or place of use. Several states have sought to alleviate this
problem by allowing approval of such changes without loss of priority,
so long as existing rights are not adversely affected. 266 The difficulty
in securing approval is especially acute when the applicant contem-
plates a change from a nonconsumptive to a consumptive use, 267
263 Fisher, supra note 251, at 102.
264 An extreme example of what the fixity of these flow interrelationships can produce
is cited by Trelease. A ground water diversion of 100,000 acre-feet in the upper portion
of Frenchman Creek area in Colorado reduces flow at the lower end by only 15,000 acre-
feet. In Beaver Creek, a cessation of a ground water diversion of 20,000 acre-feet enlarges
streamflow by only 1000 acre-feet. Trelease, Model Code, supra note 178, at 311 n.63,
citing Denver Post, Nov. 18, 1956, Roundup Sect. at 9, col. 2. Similarly, high channel
transmission losses in western streams require large flows at the headwaters to produce
a small flow far downstream to protect senior appropriative rights. By contrast, the flow
in an eastern stream below a diversion will be replenished within a relatively short
distance from tributary and ground water recharge.
265 See Tattersfield v. Putnam, 45 Ariz. 156, 171, 41 P.2d 228, 234 (1935); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 46-122 (1960) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2 (1957). Several statutes virtually
freeze the appropriation right to the land unless, because of a natural cause beyond the
control of the diverter, it is impracticable to use the water on the assigned land benefi-
cially or economically. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.040 (1967); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82,
§ 34 (1952) ; S.D. Code § 61.0128 (Supp. 1960). Most western states, however, allow
transfers without loss of priority if other rights are not affected. Colorado is especially
liberal in this respect. See, e.g., Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 93 Colo. 246, 249,
26 P.2d 102, 103 (1933). This problem is discussed in W. Hutchins, supra note 254, at
378-84.
266 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-172 (Supp. 1967); Calif. Water Code §§ 1700-06
(West 1956), as amended, §§ 1701-05.5 (West Supp. 1967) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148-9-
22 (1963) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 42-222 (1948); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-708(b) (1964) ; N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 75-5-23 (1968) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 61-04-15 (Supp. 1967); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 540.510 (1963) ; Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1967) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
90.03.380 (1962). See J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water Supply: Eco-
nomics, Technology, and Policy 239-42 (1960).
267 See W. Hutchins, supra note 254, at 382-84; Trelease, Policies, supra note 178,
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thereby diminishing the rate of return flow to the stream and devalu-
ating the rights of downstream junior appropriators. Similar difficulties
may occur when a significant change in point of diversion is contem-
plated.
The seriousness of this problem throughout the West is only
now under investigation."' Recent studies have found that locational
rigidities presented great difficulties in effecting water transfers. In
Colorado, the City of Denver discovered it had to construct a dam
in, and a pipeline from, a distant unpopulated mountain area rather
than to purchase water rights nearby because of the difficulties inher-
ent in securing transfers of water rights by the judicial procedure
followed in that state.'" In California, locational rigidities were found
to inhibit water transfers greatly.2" In Wyoming, a statute forbidding
the severance of a water right from the land on which it is used has
severely restricted transfers of water between agricultural users.
However, a number of exceptions has arisen in favor of certain pre-
fered users.27' Perhaps it is too soon to generalize from these studies,
since the law in each prior appropriation state is different.
Proponents of prior appropriation suggest that changes of use
can be effected by making the right freely transferable,272 so that the
new user can purchase the rights he needs from older users who are
willing to sell. Yet even if the right is made legally transferable, the
transfer rigidity problem just discussed will continue to keep it eco-
nomically nontransferable. How this problem would be overcome is
not explained. Presumably both the transferred right and all affected
rights would have to be purchased provided, of course, that they are
available for sale."'
at 32. See, e.g., Featherman v. Hennessy, 43 Mont. 310, 115 P. 983 (1911) ; Broughton
v. Stricklin, 146 Ore. 259, 269-70, 28 P.2d 219, 222 (1933).
268 A number of preliminary and exploratory reports on research currently underway
are located in Water Resources and Economic Development of the West series, Con-
ference Proceedings of Committee on Economics of Water-Resources Development of
Western Agricultural Economics Research Council.
269 Seastone & Hartman, Alternative Institutions for Water Transfers: The Experi-
ence in Colorado and New Mexico, 39 Land Econ. 31 (1963).
270 Gaffney, Diseconomies Inherent in Western Water Laws: A California Case
Study, in Economic Analysis of Multiple Use 55 (Proceedings of Western Agricultural
Economics Research Council, Tucson, Ariz., Jan. 23-24, 1961, Water and Range Re-
sources and Economic Development of the West series, Report No. 9).
277 Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress—Case Studies of the Transfer of Water
Rights, 1 Land & Water L. Rev. I, 67-73 (1966). The Wyoming experience is the re-
sult of the "no change" statute enacted in .1909 which ties water rights to the land. Wyo.
Laws 1909, ch. 68, 1, as amended, Wyo. Stat. 41-2 (1957).
272 Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J. Law &
Econ. 41,56 (1959) ; Trelease, Policies, supra note 178, at 30.
273 See Gaffney, Comparison of Market Pricing and Other Means of Allocating Water
Resources, in Water Law and Policy in the Southeast 195, 221 (Instit. of Law and Gov't,
Univ. of Ga., 1962).
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b. Rationality of Human Behavior. This proposed solution is
grounded on the assumption that human beings act rationally and
will sell their water rights to a person who offers an attractive price.
The assumption is unfounded. Especially in arid western areas water
has acquired a mystique—it is regarded as something much different
than a valuable mineral to be exploited. Water is essential to life
and to productive land, and people often may decline to give up their
rights to it even if it demonstrably is profitable for them to do so.'
c. Use Preferences. Creation of preferences among uses is another
way to achieve flexibility. None of the western states have adopted a
true preference: a right of preferred users to take water while inferior
users have no privilege to do so in time of shortage regardless of
temporal priority. Preferences adopted in prior appropriation states
take three forms: (1) giving the preferred user the power to condemn
and pay for nonpreferred water rights, (2) giving the state the power
to withdraw water from general appropriation and reserve it for pre-
ferred uses to be developed in the future, or (3) creating a rule for
choosing between substantially simultaneous applications for water
rights.' Three western states have granted condemnation powers to
preferred users by constitutional provision." Five others have created
statutory preferences controlling simultaneous applications and three
have granted condemnation powers."'
None of these states agree on the content of the list of preferred
uses or their order of preference. Generally, however, the preference
274 Trelease, Policies, supra note 178, at 39-42; Trelease & Lee, supra note 271, at
73; Williams, supra note 260, at 178, 190-91.
275 See Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 133, 134-43
(1955).
216 See Colo. Coast. art. XVI, § 6 (domestic, agricultural and manufacturing uses);
Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3 (domestic uses, mining and milling uses in organized mining
districts, agricultural uses, and manufacturing uses); Neb. Const. art. XV, § 6 (domestic,
agricultural, and manufacturing uses).
277 The following statutes establish the orders of preference listed. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 45-147 (Supp. 1967) ((1) domestic and municipal uses, (2) irrigation and stock
watering, (3) water power and mining, and (4) recreation and wildlife, including fish—
regulates pending applications) ; Calif. Water Code §§ 106, 1254, 1460 (West 1956) ((I)
domestic and municipal uses, and (2) irrigation—regulates pending applications); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 82a-707(b) (1967) ((1) domestic, (2) municipal, (3) irrigation, (4) in-
dustial, (5) recreational, and (6) waterpower uses—condemnation of inferior uses) ;
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 540.140 (1963) ((1) domestic, (2) agricultural, and (3) manufacturing
uses—perference in time of shortage); Tex. Civ, Stat. Ann. art. 7471 (1954) ((1) domes-
tic and municipal uses, (2) water used in manufacturing processes and steam generation
of power, (3) irrigation, (4) mining and mineral recovery, (5) hydroelectric power, (6)
navigation, and (7) recreation and pleasure—regulates pending applications) ; Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-21 (1953) ((1) domestic, (2) agricultural, and (3) other uses—preference
in time of shortage) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.03.040 (1962) (condemnation of in-
ferior uses for "beneficial". uses); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3 (1957) ((1) drinking water
for man and beast, (2) municipal uses, (3) railroad, household and certain commercial
uses, and (4) industrial uses—right to condemn inferior uses).
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order is: (1) domestic and municipal uses, (2) agricultural uses, and
(3) manufacturing uses.' This order of preference reflects the bias
of economic thinking at the times the statutes were enacted. They
may be out of step with current thought.' Only an Oklahoma order
of the 1920's, since repealed, seemed to be relatively modern, reflecting
the need for cooling water and waste dilution flows . 2"
6. Protecting the Public Interest.—Prior appropriation has been con-
sidered not very effective in its protection of water supply for public
uses."' The common law rights of navigation, fishing and the like
may still be recognized, but very rarely has water been reserved to
make such uses possible. Prior appropriation has traditionally pro-
moted rapid development of water resources by private entrepreneurs.
The judiciary of prior appropriation states has frequently declined to
construe public uses of water flows in streams for recreational purposes
as constituting appropriations for a beneficial use, and has subordi-
nated such uses to the appropriative rights of private entrepreneurs.'"
To overcome this interpretation of beneficial use, several western
states have enacted legislation allowing the states to make appropria-
tions of unappropriated water for various public uses."' Even then
the administering agency may rule that a particular in-place public
use does not constitute an appropriation?"
Recreational public uses are becoming more and more important
throughout the United States. The fact that, for historical reasons,
the western states have not adequately provided for public uses of
water in their prior appropriation statutes is no reason why the
eastern states adopting prior appropriation need make the same mis-
take. Minimum streamflows for protection of public uses and for
waste dilution purposes ought to be relatively easy to establish when-
ever a new system is introduced into a state. Mississippi, the only
eastern state to adopt prior appropriation, has provided for establish-
278 For a list of the order of preferences in particular states, see note 277 supra.
279 Trelease, supra note 275, at 159; Trelease, Model Code, supra note 178, at 315.
282 This order controlled waters in Conservancy Districts only. Okla. Laws 1923-24,
ch. 139, § 25 ((1) domestic and municipal uses, (2) manufacturing, steam production,
cooling, and waste dilution, and (3) irrigation, power, recreation, fisheries and other uses
—regulated pending application). It was ultimately replaced by Okla. Laws 1967, ch. 382,
§ 5, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 577 (Supp. 1967), which states that water rights are
governed by the laws of the state.
281 See Trelease, Preferences, supra note 178; Comment, Water Appropriation For
Recreation, 1 Land & Water L. Rev. 209 (1966).
282 See Comment, supra note 281, at 210-14. But see, e.g., Empire Water & Power Co.
v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
283 Special legislative appropriations were made by Idaho Code Ann. §§ 67-4301,
-4304 (1949) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 538.110-.300 (1965)'. No general authorization for recrea-
tion appropriations appears to have been enacted by any state.
297 In re Applications 12919A et al., Calif. St. Water Rights Bd., Dec. D-1030 (1961).
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ment of minimum streamflows which no appropriation may invade.'
Iowa, adopting a nonpriority permit system, has done so as well.'
7. Prior Appropriation—Conclusion.—The appropriative right's secur-
ity has been eroded to some extent by overappropriation and by the
presence of residual riparian rights. The system is generally efficient
because of the requirement of beneficial use and the absence of place-
of-use limitations; but less than efficient in allowing streams to sustain
high losses along their course toward downstream senior appropria-
tions. It has not favored the recognition of public interests.
D. Permit Systems Without Temporal Priorities
Believing riparianism to be inadequate for coping with the water
problems lying ahead, several eastern states have enacted permit
statutes replacing or supplementing the riparian doctrine.' In 1957,
Iowa substituted a temporal nonpriority permit system for its previous
riparian system.' Temporal nonpriority permits for diversions for
most purposes are now required in Minnesota 289 and in certain areas
of Florida' and of New Jersey."' Wisconsin requires such permits
for irrigation diversion" and Kentucky and Maryland for some
industrial and other purposes.' These legislative responses to the
growing demand for water for conflicting uses are bound to multiply
in the years to come.
285 Miss. Code Ann. 55 5956-04(c), (d) (Supp. 1966) (exceptions for domestic and
municipal uses, or where the exception will not affect "proper utilization of water re-
sources").
286 Iowa Code Ann. §5 455A.1, .22 (Supp. 1968). Hines, A Decade of Experience
Under the Iowa Water Permit System—Part One, 7 Natural Resources J. 499, 537-44
(1967).
287 For discussions of eastern water permit legislation, see Ellis, Developing Trends
in Water Law in the Eastern States, in Proceedings of the Water Resources Colloquium
24 (Instit. Research Land & Water Resources, Pa. St. Univ., 1967) ; Heath, Water Man-
agement Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 Land & Water L. Rev. 99 (1967) ; Plager Sr
Maloney, Emerging Patterns for Regulation of Consumptive Use of Water in the Eastern
United States, 43 Ind. L.J. 383 (1968).
288 Iowa Code Ann. ch. 455A (Supp. 1968).
289 Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 105.41-A7 (1964), as amended, §§ 105.41, .46 (Supp. 1967).
For a discussion of the experience under this act, see Nohre & Raup, Regulation of Water
Use in Minnesota Agriculture (Minn. Agric. Exp. Sta. Bull. 453 (1961)).
295 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.144 (Supp. 1968) (in designated areas or in water regula-
tory districts). To date, the act has not been applied to any part of Florida. For an
extensive discussion of the experience under this act, see Plager & Maloney, supra note
287, at 392-94.
291 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:1-35 to -50 (1966) (in designated watersheds).
292 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 30.18(1)-(3) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967). For a dis-
cussion of the experience under this statute, see F.H. Osterhoudt, An Economic Analysis
of Wisconsin's Diversion Permit System for Agricultural Irrigation 40-173 (Ph.D. thesis,
Univ. of Wis., 1967) ; Comment, Wisconsin's Water Diversion Law: A Study of Ad-
ministrative Case Law, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 279.
295 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 151.150 (Supp. 1967); Md. Code Ann., art. 96A, § 13
(Supp. 1967).
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Governments have evolved two basic types of permit system which
do not create priorities with respect to time of first beneficial use. One
emphasizes regulation of private activity to prevent overdraft of
water supplies and to protect public uses. The Iowa permit system
and the Model Water Use Act are examples."' The other emphasizes
state control of water resource development to promote government
enterprise in irrigation development. The Australian systems are of
this type. The following discussion must be based almost entirely on
existing statutes and administrative practices because very little liter-
ature of advocacy has appeared in support of nonpriority permit
systems.
1. Description of Concepts.—Most of the temporal nonpriority sys-
tems that have been adopted to American use have not been in exis-
tence long enough to have taken on any homogeneous form. Among
the features that do run through the various statutes is the equality
of right of all permits regardless of when they were granted. This is
the paramount difference between temporal nonpriority and prior
appropriation permit systems. Another feature is that the temporal
nonpriority permit statutes require application of water to a beneficial
use in order that the right be acquired and maintained.2" Permits
are issued only for amounts of water actually being put to use. The
concept allows for the creation of preferred uses, as under some prior
appropriation statutes. The right may be lost by nonuse of the water
after a period of years. The more recent statutes establish permits
whose life is for a term of years rather than in perpetuity.2"
2. Efficiency: Beneficial Use, Loss by Nonuse, Fees.
a. Application. Temporal nonpriority permit systems borrow from
prior appropriation several concepts that promote efficiency of use.
Two of the most important to temporal nonpriority systems are bene-
ficial use and loss by nonuse. The beneficial use concept requires that
the user put the water to an economic use •to acquire a right to the
water. In prior appropriation states a beneficial use is often confined
to uses requiring actual application of water to the land for economic
benefit to the private diverter or to hydro-power flow uses.297 The
temporal nonpriority permit systems often have expanded the defini-
294 Iowa Code Ann. ch. 455A (Supp. 1968) ; Model Water Use Act, Prefatory Note
(Handbook of Nat'l Conf. of Uniform Laws Comm'rs, Proceedings 174-77 (1958))
[hereinafter cited as Model Water Use Act].
295 This requirement is also found in the prior appropriation system.
295 E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:1-44 (.1966) (not over 25 years).
297 See Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 80-82, 166 P.
309, 310-11 (1917). See also discussion of changing location of use in western prior ap-
propriation states pp. 692-94 supra.
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tion to include various public or quasi-public uses,'" such as water
for minimum flows to maintain fish populations or for recreational
purposes. This expanded definition is in keeping with today's concepts
of proper uses for water. Essential to the concept of beneficial use in
both systems is the notion that water should not be wasted or be
allowed to go unused if other demands for water go unsatisfied.'"
The nonpriority permit system has also adopted the concept of
loss of rights by nonuse or waste of water or failure to use it bene-
ficially for a certain period of time. Rights under nonpriority permit
systems exist only as long as they continue to be exercised by the
user. If a holder of a water right fails to exercise his right for the
requisite number of years, that failure is deemed to constitute aban-
donment of the right (unless he can show circumstances which rebut
that presumption), or the failure may bring a statutory forfeiture of
the right regardless of circumstances 300 Unused rights are thereby
eliminated and the water under them may be reallocated to other
uses. The forfeiture procedure will operate effectively only if uses
are closely policed.
Fees are imposed on the acquisition of water rights in various
jurisdictions. At this time, for example, fees are charged for permits
in Mississippi"' and in a few western states to defray the cost of
operating the permit system. 302 These are, hopefully, large enough to
give users incentive to use all the water taken by or assigned to them,
or to relinquish the right of use. New Jersey charges fees for amounts
of water diverted for consumptive use or flow utilized for power."'
298 Iowa Code Ann. § 455A.1 (Supp. 1968) and Miss. Code Ann. § 5956-02(e)
(Supp. 1966) define "beneficial use" as the application of water to a useful purpose that
inures to the benefit of the water user, but does not include waste or pollution of water.
Model Water Use Act § 102 defines it as "a use of water, including the method of
diversion, storage, transportation, and application, that is reasonable and consistent with
the public interest in the proper utilization of water resources, including, but not limited
to, domestic, agricultural, industrial, power, municipal, navigational, fish and wildlife, and
recreational uses." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.081(6) (Supp. 1968) has a nearly identical defini-
tion.
299 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 302 (1947).
300 Iowa Code Ann. § 455A.29 (Supp. 1968) (forfeiture after 3 years' nonuse) ;
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 5956-05 to -06 (Supp. 1966) (forfeiture after 3 years' nonuse) ;
Model Water Use Act § 412(a) (4) (forfeiture—no period stated). Waste is defined in the
Iowa statute as, inter alia, the use of water "so that it is not put to its full beneficial use,"
and the transportation of water so "that there is an excessive loss in transit." Iowa Code
Ann. § 455A.1 (Supp. 1968). A license to divert in Australia is lost if the water is not
beneficially used. No period of nonuse is prescribed. See note 160 supra.
301 Miss. Code Ann. § 5956-16 (Supp. 1966).
302 Model Water Use Act § 415, and statutes cited in the Comment appended thereto.
Fisher, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in Law of Water
Allocation 75, 134 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958).
303 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:1-46 (1966). Power users in Nebraska and Oregon pay fees
proportional to the amount of water used. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-236 (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 543.710 (1965).
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Certainly annual fees would help reduce the problem of "paper rights"
and overappropriation. 3°4
b. Locational Efficiency—Use on Nonriparian Land. If a system
of water law is to be efficient, it must allow use of water on nonriparian
land. A temporal nonpriority permit system could be set up to allow
such use if water is available. Most of the existing eastern permit
statutes are silent on this point so that it is not certain whether the
common law place-of-use restrictions remain in force. Only the Florida
permit statute specifically allows diversions to nonriparian land. 3°5
An Illinois statute allows nonriparian use under permit for industrial,
manufacturing or public utility purposes. 3°6 The Wisconsin irrigation
permit statute allows irrigators to use water on contiguous nonriparian
land provided the total irrigated acreage does not exceed that which
is irrigable on the riparian tract alone. 30T There seems no reason not
to permit use on nonriparian land, whether by riparians or nonripa-
rians. Pemission for such use should be refused only in those particular
instances that would cause hardships to other diverters.
Where nonriparian use is allowed, the problem of nonriparian
users' lack of access to water can arise. Adoption of the "easement of
aqueduct" concept would alleviate that problem. The concept empowers
a water user to condemn a right-of-way for a ditch across a third per-
son's land to gain access to water?" Payment of compensation is
required by those jurisdictions in the western United States309 and
Australia310 which have adopted the device. The granting of the power
to condemn a right of way and the determination of where it is to run
should be controlled by the administering agency through the issuance
of permits.
304 Whether such fees may be charged for permits authorizing continuation of uses
existing prior to enactment of the permit statute is not clear, but little doubt exists that
fees could be charged for new uses. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182
(1923); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923).
305 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.141(1) (Supp. 1968). See also Model Water Use Act §
407(c). An earlier Florida statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 271.09(1) (1962), appears to restrict
use to riparian land.
3" Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 19, § 65 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
307 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 30.18(5) (Supp. 1968).
3°8 See C. Scott-Moncrieff, Irrigation in Southern Europe 171 (1868). In the 19th
century, probably in recognition of customary practice, the concept was incorporated into
European water codes. Spanish Law of Waters 1879, art. 77.
3°9 Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 7; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-14-3, 50-2-1 (1963);
Mont. Const. art. III, § 15; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 89-820 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 46-246 to -247 (1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.050 (1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-3
(1968); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 2 (1952); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 772.305(1) (1963); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7583 (1954); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-6 (1961); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 90.03.040, .36.010 (1962); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-794 (Supp. 1967).
91° Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, 203 (Viet.); Water Act 1912-1966, § 13A(1)
(N.S.W.).
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3. Flexibility.—An obvious way to make a permit system flexible
is to keep the term of the permit short. The question is, of course,
by how much. Economists usually have argued that the period should
be long enough to allow users to recover their investments in water
resources works.' This idea was accepted by the drafters of the
Model Water Use Act who inserted a permit term of up to 50 years,"
The New Jersey statute requires a term long enough to allow amor-
tization of capital investments, but not over 25 years.' If a shorter
period is selected, investors will probably worry about loss of "sunk"
costs if their permits are not renewed, and will be reluctant to invest.
The Kentucky statute seems especially deficient in this regard, since
the term of the permit is determined by the administrative agency?"
In several permit system states, holders of permits have tended to
let them lapse rather than invest in surface water resources. In Mis-
sissippi, for example, industrial users have been shifting to ground
water because of its higher quality in spite of the perpetuity of the
Mississippi permit. 315 In Iowa, farmers have been letting irrigation
permits lapse because of an ample supply of water, inability of farmers
to accumulate sufficient funds to invest in irrigation, and inability to
hire labor to operate irrigation systems. 3" In Wisconsin, irrigators
have been abandoning their perpetual permits and shifting from
streams to wells as sources of supply either because of the latter's
greater physical convenience of operation and in spite of the well's
greater capital and operating costs or because of riparian land limita-
tions imposed by the permits. 317 The significance of these trends is
evidently that at least when ground water is plentiful the term of the
permit plays a very minor role in the decision of farmers whether or
not to invest in irrigation supplied by streams.
The nonpriority permit system is flexible in that it provides for
transferability of the right to successors in title to the land where the
water is used 3 18 The flexibility of the system can be increased by mak-
ing the right transferable regardless of place of use.
4. Protection of the Public Interest—Concept of Minimum Protected
311 The economists' argument is recognized in O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute
—The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 549, 579-
80 (1962); Trelease, Policies, supra note 178, at 25-26.
313 Model Water Use Act § 406.
313 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:1-44 (1966).
314 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 151.140, .170(1) (Supp. 1967). Another way to insure
flexibility is to provide for condemnation by preferred classes of users, with compensa-
tion for termination of a permit before its renewal date.
315 W.H. Champion, Transition from Riparian Doctrine, in Proceedings of the
Water Resources Colloquium 46 (Instit. Research Land & Water Resources, Pa. St. Univ.
1967).
316 O'Connell, supra note 351, at 579-80.
317 F. Osterhoudt, supra note 292, at 220-29.
313 See p. 666 & note 109 supra.
701
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Flows.—The public interest requires that any system of water alloca-
tion should establish a net minimum flow for public purposes, and
should protect it from invasion by private diverters. Commercial
navigation, recreational boating, fishing, hunting and swimming are
some of the public purposes that should thus be furthered. As the
population of the East grows, the significance of these public uses
and the political importance of preserving and enhancing them will in-
crease.
Under riparianism, private rights have always been subjected to
the superior public rights. All that is necessary, if a permit system
should be adopted in a previously riparian state, is to quantify those
public rights. Thus nothing will be taken from existing users, and they
will benefit by having the extent of public rights defined.
The Florida, Iowa and New Jersey nonpriority permit systems and
the Mississippi prior appropriation system provide for establishment
of minimum streamflows.31° A rather large base minimum protected
flow is established in Iowa, being "the flow equalled or exceeded by the
stream involved 84 percent of the time between April and September"
in normal past years, as determined by the U.S. Geological Survey
streamflow records.'" Adjustments are made up or down to reflect the
demand of the public interest.
The Kentucky statute gives the administrative agency more dis-
cretion. It may refuse a permit application if the quality, time, place
or rate of withdrawal will be detrimental to the public interests of
rights of other public water users."' Otherwise, it cannot deny a permit
to a responsible applicant.322
5. Substitution of Permit Systems for Riparianism.—If riparianism
should be replaced by any other system of allocation, one must consider
how to treat vested riparian rights.' Riparian states which have
substituted permit systems for riparianism since 1945 and have pre-
319 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.1410) (Supp. 1968) (defined by id. §§ 373.081(8), (9));
Iowa Code Ann. § 455A.22 (Supp. 1968) (defined by id. § 455A.1) ; Miss. Code Ann. §
5956-04(c), (d) (Supp. 1966) (defined by id. § 5956-02(i)); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:1-40
(1966) (defined by id. § 58:1-35). Florida prohibits diversions which would materially
interfere with water developed and operated for recreational purposes or as tourist attrac-
tions. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.101 (1960).
329 Hines, supra note 286, at 540-41.
321 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.. § 151.170(1) (Supp. 1967).
322 Id. § 151.170(2).
323 Fisher, Due Process and Effect of Eastern Appropriation Proposals on Exist-
ing Rights, with Special Emphasis on the Michigan Proposal, in Law of Water Alloca-
tion 441 (Haber & Bergen ed. 1958) ; O'Connell, supra note 311; King, Regulation of
Water Rights under the Police Power, in Water Resources and the Law 269 (Univ. of
Mich. Law School, 1958). See Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, in Water Resources
and the Law 131 (Univ. of Mich. Law School, 1958).
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served or protected exercised riparian rights are Florida, Kansas,
Mississippi and New Jersey.'
The administering agency in Iowa has refused to recognize the
vestedness of any riparian rights, exercised or dormant. It has subject-
ed all applications for permits for irrigation withdrawals to the same
review whether or not the withdrawals antedated the act.' This view
has not led to the cutting off of water to former riparians. In its first
10 years of operation the Iowa agency has not denied any permit be-
cause it has found all uses to be beneficial.'" In frequent cases, how-
ever, the amount, rate and duration of withdrawal requested have been
reduced.' Clearly, Iowa has not yet faced anything approaching a
critical water shortage.
Further, the Iowa statute provides that a permit shall be granted
unless public interests or the interests of property owners "with prior
or superior rights" are adversely affected.' This means that most, if
not all, riparians can expect to obtain a permit as long as water surplus
to the minimum protected flow and existing diversions is available. The
real test of the constitutionality of this provision will come when no
water is available and a riparian is denied a permit for that reason.
Prior appropriation statutes in Oregon and Kansas which cut off un-
used riparian rights and which recognized only those which were being
exercised were held constitutional as reasonable regulations for the
general welfare.'
6. Analogous Rights Created Through Army Corps of Engineers.—
Besides the nonpriority permit, which is created by state statute, there
is a kind of water right that is created by federal statute. If the Army
Corps of Engineers is involved in regulating a river by operating reser-
voirs, it has a paramount right to preempt waterfiow to protect the
navigable capacity of waters of the United States.'" If any of the
324 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.101 (1960) ; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-701(d), -703 (Supp.
1964) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 5956-04(a) (Supp. 1966); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:1-49 (1966).
See Model Water Use Act § 303.
329 Cf. Hines, supra note 286, at 523-24.
329 Id. at 532-33,
327 Id. at 534.
328 Iowa Code Ann. § 455A.20 (Supp. 1968). Mississippi has a similar provision.
Miss. Code Ann. § 5956-07 (Supp. 1966). These provisions are in contrast to the Aus-
tralian doctrine that the agency has absolute discretion whether or not to issue a diver-
sion license. Water Act 1958, Act No. 6413, § 204 (Viet.) ; Control of Waters Act 1919;
1925, § 15 (So. Austl.) ; Water Act 1912-1966, § 10 (N.S.W.).
329 See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916); Baumann v. Smrha
145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S: 863 (1956).
330 The United States may take state-created water rights on navigable streams
without compensation. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53
(1913). On the scope and effect of the navigation servitude, see Morreale, Federal Power
in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural
Resources J. 1 (1963); Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations §§ 101.3-3, in 2
Waters and Water Rights (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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water thus appropriated from common law riparians is found to be
surplus, the federal government may either allow the surplus water
to be used by riparians or may sell or assign it.' Surplus water sold
or assigned by the federal government retains its superior federal
status and may be used in derogation of all common law or state-
created rights held by riparians. Right to such water is thus secure.
Federal legislation authorizes the Corps of Engineers to provide
additional storage capacity in reservoirs for nonfederal purposes if the
local governing bodies contribute to the cost of the enlargement. 332
That additional water may prove to be subject to condemnation under
the federal navigation servitude."' If it is, then the water rights to that
additional water, whether allocated to private users by the federal
government or the local governing body, may retain its federal status.
Those derivative rights would be superior to any common law riparian
rights or any rights created by state permit.
7. Nonpriority Permit Systems—Conclusion.—A temporal nonpriority
permit system is well adapted to the state function of planning the
development of water resources. The state agency's authority under
the system to grant or deny permits or renewals empowers the agency
to favor productive development of the resource. The same is true of
the authority to permit nonriparian use. Further, the power (inherent
in some prior appropriation systems) of preferred classes of users to
condemn inferior rights could be incorporated in a nonpriority permit
system; it would tend to promote higher uses. The authority to estab-
lish minimum protected streamflows can be used to enhance recrea-
tional uses, if set at a high level, or industrial and agricultural uses,
if set at a low level. The power to reserve water for future development
and for various public purposes can be used to implement various
long-range plans.
Permit systems, especially permit systems which do not vest
rights, have the advantage of allowing a state agency to promote its
plans for development of water resources in whatever manner seems
best in the interests of the public and of economic development of the
state. The nature and degree of state intervention contemplated at any
time will be determined by the accepted concepts of private-public
331 The Corps of Engineers has statutory authority to sell surplus waters for domes-
tic and industrial uses, provided the contracts of sale do not adversely affect then exist-
ing lawful uses of such waters. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, § 6, 58 Stat. 890, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 708 (1964).
332 Flood Control Act of 1936, § 5, 49 Stat. 1572, as added by War Department
Civil Appropriation Act of 1937, § 1, 50 Stat. 515, 33 U.S.C. § 701h (1964). Corps reser-
voirs enlarged under this legislation are under construction on the Kaskaskia River at
Carlyle and Shelbyville, Illinois. Water rights from these reservoirs are being allocated
by the Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Waterways.
333 Morreale, supra note 330, §§ 101.3-.5.
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interaction. The degree of direct state enterprise accepted in Australia
is not likely to be accepted in this country; neither are our governmental
units likely to abdicate all responsibility for resource development.
The temporal nonpriority permit system, more than any other, leaves
the door open for the state at some future time to alter its intervention
policy, while protecting actual uses for reasonable periods of time. As
in Iowa, the primary impetus for development may be left to the pri-
vate entrepreneur, subject to regulation in the public interest. If, at a
later time, as in the western United States or Australia, a state decides
it must play a more active role, that change of policy may be made
without scrapping the permit system.
E. Market Place for Water Rights
Several economists feel that riparian rights in the East are too
insecure to give incentive for private investment in water resource
development. They find, on the other hand, that the prior appropriation
system as it is practiced in the West is too rigid to allow shifts of
water rights to new uses. They believe that a well-defined water right
which is freely salable would provide the most satisfactory method of
creating security for capital investment in ascertained supplies, while
retaining flexibility to accommodate new uses. 334 Such systems are
framed with the end of allowing rights to shift to the most beneficial
uses, that is, to those for which water is most valuable.
1. Concepts.
a. The Hirshleifer-De Haven-Milliman Proposal. The predomi-
nant thinking by economists in this field is probably represented by Jack
Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven and Jerome W. Milliman 3 35 They pre-
sent a generalized four-part program for reform of state water laws:
First, any trend towards centralized state administrative control by
issuance of permits should be abandoned. It is argued that state agen-
cies tend to be arbitrary and cannot hope to acquire a water user's
detailed knowledge or experience as to what constitutes a most effective
use. Second, clearly defined water property rights based on the appro-
priative rights doctrine should be created so that users will have an
unambiguous property right in water, certain in tenure. Third, water
rights should be freely transferable by sale among users, and should
not be acquired gratis by the state under navigation servitude or pre-
emptory public rights concepts. Fourth, water law should recognize
334 See, e.g., J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics,
Technology, and Policy, chs. HI, IV, IX, XII (1960) ; Gaffney, Comparison of Market
Pricing and Other Means of Allocating Water Resources, in Water Law and Policy in
the Southeast 195, 200 (Instit. of Law & Gov't, Univ. of Ga., 1962) ; Milliman, Water
Law and Private Decision Making: A Critique, 2 J. Law & Econ. 41 (1959).
335 J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, supra note 334, at 254.
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communality of water supply and interdependencies of use. Free mar-
ket transactions should be regulated where necessary to protect third
parties from spill-over costs resulting from transfers of water rights
or changes in use patterns. Protective devices to this end would in-
clude zoning restrictions, common pooling as in the oil and gas indus-
try, use taxes to finance reimbursement schemes and compensation for
damages. These devices are designed to create a decentralized market
where water allocation decisions are determined by economic forces
primarily by the price system while third parties are protected from
the consequences of the operations of traders and users.
b. Gaffney Proposal. M. Mason Gaffney has made a unique pro-
posal with three components: a bid price, a transportation charge, and
a land tax.336 Under this scheme, defined water rights would be sold by
a watermaster at scheduled frequent intervals at a special water right
exchange. A user who has purchased a right would own it only until the
time of the next sale, when it would again be available for purchase.
Sale would be made according to a flexible price schedule based on
marginal utility and designed to sell all available water. At the time of
each sale each user would submit a schedule indicating how much water
he would take at various prices. For example, a buyer might bid for
1000 gallons at $1 and for another 1000 gallons at $.75. The water-
master would sell the available quantity at the highest bid prices suc-
cessively until the supply was exhausted. It would sometimes happen,
then, that a previous user would be outbid, and would acquire no water
at a given sale. Prices would be free on board and would not reflect
transportation costs from the central distribution point. Transportation
costs would be an additional charge Finally, a fixed land tax would be
levied against all lands served by the system. This tax would be high-
est near the source of supply and would be lower farther away. It
would reflect the reliability of service (highest near the source of sup-
ply), and the cost of transport, which would be higher farther away.
Gaffney expects the total inclusive cost of water to be relatively
uniform, or to rise only slowly with distance from the source of supply;
for such a result would satisfy the ethical and political demands of
distributive equity."' While bid pricing will allow new users to pur-
chase the water rights they need if water is sufficiently valuable to
them, Gaffney believes existing users need not fear about losing their
water supply because "they can rationally pay generously, to maintain
the value of their sunk investments, while the newcomers must net
out the cost of their as-yet-unsunk investments to find the residual
they can afford to pay for water."'"
336 Id. at 59-73, 252.
337 Gaffney, supra note 334, at 203-07.
388 Id. at 224.
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Gaffney's proposal probably stems from his research on transfers
of water rights in several irrigation districts of California. He found
that water rights frequently were not transferred because of the great
difficulties of overcoming obstacles to transfers under the prior appro-
priation permit statute.339 He must have been impressed also by the
proliferation of independent parallel irrigation water distribution sys-
tems in California. 2".
2. Security of the Market Place Right.
a. Hirshleifer-De Haven-Milliman Proposal. The marketplace
right under the Hirshleifer-De Haven-Milliman concept ought to be
quite secure. It would be definite in volume, rate of withdrawal and
priority of right, and would thus be reliable for investment purposes.
b. Gaffney Proposal. Under the Gaffney proposal, a water user
could lose his water right at any time to a higher bidder. Shifts of
water to municipal or industrial uses are inevitable under such a sys-
tem where such demands exist, because agricultural users cannot com-
pete with them in a bidding situation. Hence, the Gaffney proposal
enhances the influence of market forces at the cost of creating a highly
insecure water right. If it is in the public interest to promote or pre-
serve irrigated agriculture in areas where heavy demands on water by
municipalities and industries are likely, the water allocation system
must reflect that policy decision. The Gaffney proposal does not do so.
3. Applicational Efficiency of Use.
a. Hirshleifer-De Haven-Milliman Proposal. The Hirshleifer-De
Haven-Milliman proposal would, in operation, favor the transferral of
water to higher value users, and thus seems to treat water merely as
another resource input in the economic process. The proponents
espouse maximization of output per unit volume of water as the best
measure of the social value of the use. The goal of maximization is to
be achieved by encouraging shifts of water to those users who can
afford to pay the most. Owners of rights and bidders would make the
choice as to whether a shift should take place—not any representative
339 M. Gaffney, Diseconomies Inherent in Western Water Laws: A California Case
Study, in Economic Analysis of Multiple-Use 55, 70-74 (Proceedings of Western Agri-
cultural Economics Research Council, Tucson, Ariz., Jan. 23-24, 1961, Water and Range
Resources and Economic Development of the West series, Report No. 9).
Gaffney and Trelease had a lively exchange on the water transfer issue in response
to this study. See Trelease, Water Law and Economic Transfers of Water, 43 J. Farm
Econ. 1147 (1961); Gaffney, Water Law and Economic Transfers of Water: A reply, 44
J. Farm Econ. 427 (1962); Trelease, Water Law and Economic Transfers of Water: A
Rejoinder, 44 J. Farm Econ. 435 (1962).
349 On this point, see also Bain, Water Resource Development in California: The
Comparative Efficiency of Local, State and Federal Agencies, in Water Research 51, 58-59
(A. Kneese & S. Smith ed. 1966).
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of the overall public interest. If maximization of output reflects the
goal of society, perhaps high-value municipal and industrial uses ought
to be preferred to lower value agricultural and recreational uses. Also,
if the decisions of private entrepreneurs do represent the public inter-
est, the general market place system would be socially beneficial. There
is very real question, however, whether the proposal of the three econo-
mists adequately reflects the public interest in lower-value uses such as
irrigated agriculture and recreational facilities.
b. Gaffney Proposal. The Gaffney bid price proposal is subject
to these strictures to an even greater degree. In operation it would
place a special premium on use of water for municipalities and indus-
try, since these interests can generally pay a higher price than agri-
culture can,391 even in the instances when agricultural uses would be in
the better interests of the public. Of course, the watermaster could allo-
cate only a portion of the water to higher value uses, but that would
defeat the primary purpose of the concept that the market place should
determine the decision about the type of use.
4. Flexibility to Accommodate New Uses.
a. Hirshleifer-De Haven-Milliman Proposal. The Hirshleifer-
De Haven-Milliman proposal is supposed to allow transfer of water to
higher value uses. This will occur to the extent owners of water rights
are willing to sell their rights to new users. This human factor should
not be ignored because right holders may not be willing to sell water
even if it demonstrably is profitable for them to do so. By refusal they
can raise an effective barrier against encroachment on water supplies
by new users. If they price their rights consistently on a very high
level, they may effectively prevent transfers to many desireable uses
and encourage speculation in water rights. If offers are set high enough
to meet the rightholders' demands, however, the owners will probably
venture to sell in enough cases to make the system worthwhile.
One problem affecting the proposal is interdependency of water
uses.' The system does not seem to deal with the possibility that
interdependencies may be so interlocked that shifting the location of
diversion to place of use would be impractical. The requirement of
compensation for affected third parties for damages sustained as a
result of changes in use patterns would raise so many claims on a
341 Often it is difficult to assign definite or definable monetary values to recreational
use benefits. Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Comm'n, Economic Evaluation of
Outdoor Recreation Benefits, in Economic Studies of Outdoor Recreation 45, 49 (Study
Report No. 24, 1962) ; C. Loomer, Recreation as a Field for Economic Analysis, in
Recreation Research in the Great Plains Resource Economic Comm. of the Great Plains
Area 1, 13-19 (proceedings of a seminar sponsored by Great Plains Resource Economic
Comm. of the Great Plains Agric. Council at N.E. St. Univ., Sept. 27, 1961).
342 See discussion at pp. 692-74 supra.
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highly developed river system as to make any shifts in use there unec-
onomic. The system would thus tend to freeze historic use patterns on
highly developed rivers.
b. Gaffney Proposal. The Gaffney proposal achieves the ultimate
in accomodation of new uses. Shifts of water to high value uses (which
in practice can best afford to bid high) will occur automatically at
each sale by the watermaster.
5. Protection of Public Uses.—As proposed, both market place con-
cepts do not protect flows of water for public recreational uses, waste
dilution, fish habitat, or scenic amenities. The concept of the minimum
protected flow, discussed in relation to temporal nonpriority permit
systems,' might be incorporated. Establishment of such flows, how-
ever, would require state regulation which may violate the principle
of decentralized decision-making which the market place concept is
designed to promote.
6. Comment.—Economic market place systems seem to assume that
the greatest social benefit is achieved when a resource is put to a use
which gives it the highest 'dollars-and-cents value. The Hirshleif er-
De Haven-Milliman proposals seek to achieve security of the water
right and flexibility to accommodate new uses by relying completely on
a system that maximizes economic efficiency. It totally ignores social
needs for recreational facilities, scenic amenities, and preservation of
socially desirable but less economically efficient activities. True, eco-
nomic efficiency is a goal that should be promoted to a large degree. It
is submitted, however, that noneconomic values are becoming ever more
important, and that a system relying completely on economic efficiency
alone is archaic. Nonetheless, we should not ignore problems of secur-
ity, efficiency, and flexibility in designing legal systems to supplement
or replace the existing riparian or prior appropriation systems.
III CONCLUSION
The Australian water allocation statutory permit systems were
developed in a semi-arid environment where the predominant use has
been irrigation. Australia regulates water allocation thoroughly as part
of a national policy of intensive land development. The laws of that
country give administrative agencies wide discretionary powers to allo-
cate water to diverters inside and outside irrigation areas. To enable
the states to exercise these broad powers, common law riparian rights
have been abolished and replaced with diversion licensing systems.
The degree of governmental regulation required to manage the scarce
water resources of Australia would probably be politically unaccept-
343 See discussion at pp. 697-98 supra.
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able in the United States today, but may be proved necessary in the
future.
The American systems (riparianism in the East, prior appropria-
tion in the West) show signs of becoming outmoded as the extent and
• multiplicity of water demands increase. Riparianism seems to create
insufficiently secure rights in areas of heavy water demand. Ad hoc
methods to firm up riparian rights may prove to be too limited in scope
as water demands multiply in eastern urban and industrial areas. On
the other hand, a consideration of prior appropriation suggests that
historical use patterns are congealing into a rigid system. The scheme
seems prone to locational rigidities and interdependencies among uses.
Furthermore, the western interpretation of the "beneficial use" has
failed to preserve quantities of water for recreational uses and reten-
tion of scenic amenities.
In consideration of these problems, several states in the East have
experimented with temporal nonpriority permit systems. These systems
are capable of preventing overappropriation of water. They provide
for preservation of minimum streamflows for recreational uses and
allow for private arrangements for proration of local scarcities. The
state is able to regulate use under this system to the extent that parti-
cular circumstances require. Rights are sufficiently secure to encourage
private development of water resources in water-scarce locations, and
at the same time retain a degree of flexibility for the accommodation of
new uses. A temporal nonpriority permit system, like those in Iowa,
Minnesota and Australia is a good solution to the water problems of
today and tomorrow.
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